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Yingni Guo†, Johannes Hörner‡
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Abstract
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers.
The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. Values evolve
according to a two-state Markov chain. We solve for the optimal allocation rule, which
permits a simple implementation. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time,
and both immiseration and its polar opposite are possible long-run outcomes. Con-
sidering the limiting environment in which time is continuous, we demonstrate that
persistence hurts.
Keywords: Mechanism design. Principal-Agent. Token mechanisms.
JEL numbers: C73, D82.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the dynamic allocation of resources when transfers are not
allowed and information regarding their optimal use is private information to an individual.
The informed agent is strategic rather than truthful.
We are searching for the social choice mechanism that would bring us closest to eﬃciency.
Here, eﬃciency and implementability are understood to be Bayesian: both the individual
and society understand the probabilistic nature of uncertainty and update based on it.
∗We thank Alex Frankel, Drew Fudenberg, Juuso Toikka and Alex Wolitzky for very useful conversations.
†Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201, USA,
yingni.guo@northwestern.edu.
‡Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu.
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Both the societal decision not to allow money –for economic, physical, legal or ethical
reasons– and the sequential nature of the problem are assumed. Temporal constraints apply
to the allocation of goods, such as jobs, houses or attention, and it is often diﬃcult to
ascertain future demands.
Throughout, we assume that the good to be allocated is perishable.1 Absent private
information, the allocation problem is trivial: the good should be provided if and only if its
value exceeds its cost.2 However, in the presence of private information, and in the absence
of transfers, linking future allocation decisions to current decisions is the only instrument
available to society to elicit truthful information. Our goal is to understand this link.
Our main results are a characterization of the optimal mechanism and an intuitive in-
direct implementation for it. In essence, the agent should be granted an inside option,
corresponding to a certain number of units of the good that he is entitled to receive “no
questions asked.” This inside option is updated according to his choice: whenever the agent
desires the unit, his inside option is reduced by one unit; whenever he forgoes it, his inside
option is also revised, although not necessarily upward. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
this results in very simple dynamics: an initial phase of random length in which the eﬃcient
choice is made during each round, followed by an irreversible shift to one of the two possible
outcomes in the game with no communication, namely, the unit is either always supplied or
never supplied again. These results contrast with those from static design with multiple units
(e.g., Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007) and from dynamic mechanism design with transfers
(e.g., Battaglini, 2005).
Formally, our good can take one of two values during each round. Values are serially
correlated over time. The binary assumption is certainly restrictive, but it is known that,
even with transfers, the problem becomes intractable beyond binary types (see Battaglini
and Lamba, 2014).3 We begin with the i.i.d. case, which suﬃces to illustrate many of the
insights of our analysis, before proving the results in full generality. The cost of providing the
good is ﬁxed and known. Hence, it is optimal to assign the good during a given round if and
only if the value is high. We cast our problem of solving for the eﬃcient mechanism (given
the values, cost and agent’s discount factor) as one faced by a disinterested principal with
1Many allocation decisions involve goods or services that are perishable, such as how a nurse or a worker
should divide time; which patients should receive scarce medical resources (blood or treatments); or which
investments and activities should be approved by a firm.
2This is because the supply of the perishable good is taken as given. There is a considerable literature
on the optimal ordering policy for perishable goods, beginning with Fries (1975).
3In Section 5.2, we consider the case of a continuum of types that are independently distributed over
time.
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commitment who determines when to supply the good as a function of the agent’s reports.
There are no transfers, certiﬁcation technology, or signals concerning the agent’s value, even
ex post.
As mentioned above, we demonstrate that the optimal policy can be implemented through
a “budget” mechanism in which the appropriate unit of account is the number of units that
the agent is entitled to receive sequentially with “no questions asked.” While the updating
process when the agent forgoes a unit is somewhat subtle, it is independent of the principal’s
belief concerning the agent’s type. The only role of the prior belief is to specify the initial
budget. This budget mechanism is not a token mechanism in the sense that the total
(discounted) number of units the agent receives is not ﬁxed. Depending on the sequence
of reports, the agent might ultimately receive few or many units.4 Eventually, the agent is
either granted the unit forever or never again. Hence, immiseration is not ineluctable.
In Section 5.1, we study the continuous time limit over which the ﬂow value for the good
changes according to a two-state Markov chain. This allows us to demonstrate that persis-
tence hurts. As the Markov chain becomes more persistent, eﬃciency decreases, although
the agent might actually beneﬁt from this increased persistence.
Allocation problems in the absence of transfers are plentiful, and it is not our purpose
to survey them here. We believe that our results can inform practices concerning how to
implement algorithms to improve allocations. For example, consider nurses who must decide
whether to take alerts that are triggered by the patients seriously. The opportunity cost of
their time is signiﬁcant. Patients, however, appreciate quality time with nurses irrespective
of whether their condition necessitates it. This discrepancy produces a challenge with which
every hospital must contend: ignore alarms and risk that a patient with a serious condition
is not attended to or heed all alarms and overwhelm the nurses. “Alarm fatigue” is a serious
problem that health care must confront (see, for instance, Sendelbach, 2012). We suggest
the best approach for trading oﬀ the risks of neglecting a patient in need and attending to
one who simply cries wolf.5
Related Literature. Our work is closely related to the bodies of literature on mechanism
design with transfers and on “linking incentive constraints.” Sections 4.5 and 3.4 are devoted
to these issues and explain why transfers (resp., the dynamic nature of the relationship)
4It is not a “bankruptcy” mechanism in the sense of Radner (1986) because the specific ordering of the
reports matters.
5Clearly, our mechanism is much simpler than existing electronic nursing workload systems. However,
none appears to seriously consider strategic agent behavior as a constraint.
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matter, and hence, we will brief here.
The obvious benchmark work that considers transfers is Battaglini (2005),6 who considers
our general model but allows transfers. Another important diﬀerence is his focus on revenue
maximization, a meaningless objective in the absence of prices. The results of his work
are diametrically opposed to ours. In Battaglini, eﬃciency necessarily improves over time
(exact eﬃciency is eventually obtained with probability 1). Here, eﬃciency decreases over
time, in the sense described above, with an asymptotic outcome that is at best the outcome
of the static game. The agent’s utility can increase or decrease depending on the history
that is realized: receiving the good forever is clearly the best possible outcome, while never
receiving it again is the worst outcome. Krishna, Lopomo and Taylor (2013) provide an
analysis of limited liability (though transfers are allowed) in a model closely related to that
of Battaglini, suggesting that excluding the possibility of unlimited transfers aﬀects both
the optimal contract and dynamics. Note that there is an important exception to the quasi-
linearity commonly assumed in the dynamic mechanism design literature, namely, Garrett
and Pavan (2015).
“Linking incentive constraints” refers to the notion that as the number of identical decision
problems increases, linking them allows the designer to improve on the isolated problem.
See Fang and Norman (2006) and Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) for papers speciﬁcally
devoted to this idea (although they are much older, see Radner, 1981; Rubinstein and Yaari,
1983). Hortala-Vallve (2010) provides an interesting analysis of the unavoidable ineﬃciencies
that must be incurred away from the limit, and Cohn (2010) demonstrates the suboptimality
of the mechanisms that are commonly used, even regarding the rate of convergence. Our
focus is on the exactly optimal mechanism for a ﬁxed degree of patience, not on proving
the asymptotic optimality of a speciﬁc mechanism (numerous mechanisms yield asymptotic
optimality). This focus allows us to estimate the rate of convergence. Another important
diﬀerence from most of these papers is that our problem is truly dynamic in the sense that
the agent does not know future values but learns them as they come. Section 3.4 elaborates
on this distinction.
The notion that virtual budgets could be used as intertemporal instruments to discipline
agents with private information has appeared in several papers in economics. Möbius (2001)
might be the ﬁrst to suggest that tracking the diﬀerence in the number of favors granted
(with two agents) and using it to decide whether to grant new favors is a simple but powerful
way of sustaining cooperation in long-run relationships. See also Athey and Bagwell (2001),
6See also Zhang (2012) for an exhaustive analysis of Battaglini’s model as well as Fu and Krishna (2014).
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Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell (2012) and Kalla (2010). While these token mechanisms are
known to be suboptimal (as is clear from our characterization of the optimal mechanism),
they have desirable properties nonetheless: properly calibrated, they yield an approximately
eﬃcient allocation as the discount factor approaches one. To our knowledge, Hauser and
Hopenhayn (2008) come the closest to solving for the optimal mechanism (within the class
of PPE). Their numerical analysis allows them to qualify the optimality of simple budget
rules (according to which each favor is weighted equally, independent of the history), showing
that this rule might be too simple (the eﬃciency cost can reach 30% of surplus). Remarkably,
their analysis suggests that the optimal (Pareto-eﬃcient) strategy shares many common fea-
tures with the optimal policy that we derive in our one-player world: the incentive constraint
always binds, and the eﬃcient policy is followed unless it is inconsistent with promise keeping
(meaning when promised utilities are too extreme). Our model can be regarded as a game
with one-sided incomplete information in which the production cost of the principal is known
to the second player. There are some diﬀerences, however. First, our principal has commit-
ment and hence is not tempted to act opportunistically or bound by individual rationality.
Second, this principal maximizes eﬃciency rather than his own payoﬀ. Third, there is a
technical diﬀerence: our limiting model in continuous time corresponds to the Markovian
case in which ﬂow values switch according to a Poisson process. In Hauser and Hopenhayn,
the lump-sum value arrives according to a Poisson process, and the process is memoryless.
Li, Matouschek and Powell (2015) solve for the perfect public equilibria in a model similar
to our i.i.d. benchmark and allow for monitoring (public signals), demonstrating that better
monitoring improves performance.
More generally, that allocation rights to other (or future) units can be used as a “currency”
to elicit private information has long been recognized and dates to Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979), who ﬁrst explained the extent to which this can be viewed as a pseudo-market.
Casella (2005) develops a similar idea within the context of voting rights. Miralles (2012)
solves a two-unit version of our problem with more general value distributions, but his
analysis is not dynamic: both values are (privately) known at the outset. A dynamic two-
period version of Miralles is analyzed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Loertscher (2007).
All versions considered in this paper would be trivial in the absence of imperfect obser-
vation of the values. If the values were perfectly observed, it would be optimal to assign the
good if and only if the value is high. Due to private information, it is necessary to distort
the allocation: after some histories, the good is provided independent of the report; after
others, the good is never provided again. In this sense, the scarcity of goods provision is
endogenously determined to elicit information. There is a large body of literature in opera-
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tions research considering the case in which this scarcity is considered exogenous – there are
only n opportunities to provide the good, and the problem is then when to exercise these
opportunities. Important early contributions to this literature include Derman, Lieberman
and Ross (1972) and Albright (1977). Their analyses suggest a natural mechanism that can
be applied in our environment: the agent receives a certain number of “tokens” and uses
them whenever he pleases.
Exactly optimal mechanisms have been computed in related environments. Frankel
(2011) considers a variety of related settings. The most similar is his Chapter 2 analysis
in which he also derives an optimal mechanism. While he allows for more than two types
and actions, he restricts attention to the types that are serially independent over time (our
starting point). More importantly, he assumes that the preferences of the agent are inde-
pendent of the state, which allows for a drastic simpliﬁcation of the problem. Gershkov and
Moldovanu (2010) consider a dynamic allocation problem related to Derman, Lieberman and
Ross in which agents possess private information regarding the value of obtaining the good.
In their model, agents are myopic and the scarcity of the resource is exogenously assumed.
In addition, transfers are allowed. They demonstrate that the optimal policy of Derman,
Lieberman and Ross (which is very diﬀerent from ours) can be implemented via appropriate
transfers. Johnson (2013) considers a model that is more general than ours (he permits two
agents and more than two types). Unfortunately, he does not provide a solution to his model.
A related literature considers the related problem of optimal stopping in the absence
of transfers; see, in particular, Kováč, Krähmer and Tatur (2014). This diﬀerence reﬂects
the nature of the good, namely, whether it is perishable or durable. When only one unit is
desired and waiting is possible, this represents a stopping problem, as in their paper. With
a perishable good, a decision must be made during every round. As a result, incentives (and
the optimal contract) have hardly anything in common. In the stopping case, the agent
might have an option value to forgo the current unit if the value is low and future prospects
are good. This is not the case here – incentives to forgo the unit must be endogenously
generated via promises. In the stopping case, there is only one history of outcomes that does
not terminate the game. Here, policies diﬀer not only in when the good is ﬁrst provided but
also thereafter.
Finally, while the motivations of the papers diﬀer, the techniques for the i.i.d. benchmark
that we use borrow numerous ideas from Thomas andWorrall (1990), as we explain in Section
3, and our intellectual debt is considerable.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves the i.i.d. benchmark, introducing most
of the ideas of the paper, while Section 4 solves the general model. Section 5 extends the
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results to cases of continuous time or continuous types. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon inﬁnite, indexed by n = 0, 1, . . .. There are two parties,
a disinterested principal and an agent. During each round, the principal can produce an
indivisible unit of a good at a cost c > 0. The agent’s value (or type) during round n, vn is a
random variable that takes value l or h. We assume that 0 < l < c < h such that supplying
the good is eﬃcient if and only if the value is high, but the agent’s value is always positive.
The value follows a Markov chain as follows:
P[vn+1 = h | vn = h] = 1− ρh, P[vn+1 = l | vn = l] = 1− ρl,
for all n ≥ 0, where ρl, ρh ∈ [0, 1]. The (invariant) probability of h is q := ρl/(ρh + ρl).
For simplicity, we also assume that the initial value is drawn according to the invariant
distribution, that is, P[v0 = h] = q. The (unconditional) expected value of the good is
denoted µ := E[v] = qh+(1− q)l. We make no assumptions regarding how µ compares to c.
Let κ := 1 − ρh − ρl be a measure of the persistence of the Markov chain. Throughout,
we assume that κ ≥ 0 or, equivalently, 1− ρh ≥ ρl; that is, the distribution over tomorrow’s
type conditional on today’s type being h ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution
conditional on today’s type being l.7 Two interesting special cases occur when κ = 1 and
κ = 0. The former corresponds to perfect persistence, while the latter corresponds to
independent values.
The agent’s value is private information. Speciﬁcally, at the beginning of each round, the
value is drawn and the agent is informed of it.
Players are impatient and share a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).8 To exclude trivi-
alities, we assume throughout that δ > l/µ and δ > 1/2.
Let xn ∈ {0, 1} refer to the supply decision during round n; e.g., xn = 1 means that the
good is supplied during round n.
7The role of this assumption, which is commonly adopted in the literature, and what occurs in its absence,
when values are negatively serially correlated, is discussed at the end of Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
8The common discount factor is important. We view our principal as a social planner trading off the
agent’s utility with the social cost of providing the good as opposed to an actual player. As a social planner
internalizing the agent’s utility, it is difficult to understand why his discount rate would differ from the
agent’s.
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Our focus is on identifying the (constrained) eﬃcient mechanism deﬁned below. Hence,
we assume that the principal internalizes both the cost of supplying the good and the value
of providing it to the agent. We solve for the principal’s favorite mechanism.
Thus, given an inﬁnite history {xn, vn}∞n=0, the principal’s realized payoff is deﬁned as
follows:
(1− δ)
∞∑
n=0
δnxn(vn − c),
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor. The agent’s realized utility is deﬁned as follows:9
(1− δ)
∞∑
n=0
δnxnvn.
Throughout, payoﬀ and utility refer to the expectation of these values given the relevant
player’s information. Note that the utility belongs to the interval [0, µ].
The (risk-neutral) agent seeks to maximize his utility. We now introduce or emphasize
several important assumptions maintained throughout our analysis.
- There are no transfers. This is our point of departure from Battaglini (2005) and most
of the previous research on dynamic mechanism design. Note also that our objective
is eﬃciency, not revenue maximization. With transfers, there is a trivial mechanism
that achieves eﬃciency: supply the good if and only if the agent pays a ﬁxed price in
the range (l, h).
- There is no ex post signal regarding the realized value of the agent –not even payoﬀs are
observed. Depending on the context, it might be realistic to assume that a (possibly
noisy) signal of the value occurs at the end of each round, independent of the supply
decision. In some other economic examples, it might make more sense to assume
instead that this signal occurs only if the good is supplied (e.g., a ﬁrm discovers the
productivity of a worker who is hired). Conversely, statistical evidence might only occur
from not supplying the good if supplying it averts a risk (a patient calling for care or
police calling for backup). See Li, Matouschek and Powell (2014) for such an analysis
(with “public shocks”) in a related context. Presumably, the optimal mechanism will
diﬀer according to the monitoring structure. Understanding what happens without
any signal is the natural ﬁrst step.
- We assume that the principal commits ex ante to a (possibly randomized) mechanism.
This assumption brings our analysis closer to the literature on dynamic mechanism
9Throughout, the term payoff describes the principal’s objective and utility describes the agent’s.
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design and distinguishes it from the literature on chip mechanisms (as well as Li,
Matouschek and Powell, 2014), which assumes no commitment on either side and
solves for the (perfect public) equilibria of the game.
- The good is perishable. Hence, previous choices aﬀect neither feasible nor desirable
future opportunities. If the good were perfectly durable and only one unit were de-
manded, the problem would be one of stopping, as in Kováč, Krähmer and Tatur
(2014).
Due to commitment by the principal, we focus on policies in which the agent truthfully
reports his type during every round and the principal commits to a (possibly random) supply
decision as a function of this last report as well as of the entire history of reports without a
loss of generality.
Formally, a direct mechanism or policy is a collection (xn)
∞
n=0, with xn : {l, h}n → [0, 1]
(with {l, h}0 := {∅}),10 mapping a sequence of reports by the agent into a decision to supply
the good during a given round. Our deﬁnition exploits the fact that, because preferences are
time-separable, the policy may be considered independent of past realized supply decisions.
A direct mechanism deﬁnes a decision problem for the agent who seeks to maximize his
utility. A reporting strategy is a collection (mn)
∞
n=0, where mn : {l, h}n×{l, h} → ∆({l, h})
maps previous reports and the value during round n into a report for that round.11 The
policy is incentive compatible if truth-telling (that is, reporting the current value faithfully,
independent of past reports) is an optimal reporting strategy.
Our ﬁrst objective is to solve for the optimal (incentive-compatible) policy, that is, for
the policy that maximizes the principal’s payoﬀ subject to incentive compatibility. The value
is the resulting payoﬀ. Second, we would like to ﬁnd a simple indirect implementation of
this policy. Finally, we wish to understand the payoﬀ and utility dynamics under this policy.
3 The i.i.d. Benchmark
We begin our investigation with the simplest case in which values are i.i.d. over time; that is,
κ = 0. This is a simple extension of Thomas and Worrall (1990), although the indivisibility
caused by the absence of transfers leads to dynamics that diﬀer markedly from theirs. See
Section 4 for the analysis in the general case κ ≥ 0.
10For simplicity, we use the same symbols l, h for the possible agent reports as for the values of the good.
11Without a loss of generality, we assume that this strategy does not depend on past values, given past
reports, as the decision problem from round n onward does not depend on these past values.
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With independent values, it is well known that attention can be further restricted to
policies that can be represented by a tuple of functions Ul, Uh : [0, µ] → [0, µ], pl, ph :
[0, µ]→ [0, 1] mapping a utility U (interpreted as the continuation utility of the agent) onto
a continuation utility ul = Ul(U), uh = Uh(U) beginning during the next round as well as the
probabilities ph(U), pl(U) of supplying the good during this round given the current report
of the agent. These functions must be consistent in the sense that, given U , the probabilities
of supplying the good and promised continuation utilities yield U as a given utility to the
agent. This is “promise keeping.” We stress that U is the ex ante utility in a given round;
that is, it is computed before the agent’s value is realized. The reader is referred to Spear
and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) for details.12
Because such a policy is Markovian with respect to the utility U , the principal’s payoﬀ
is also a function of U only. Hence, solving for the optimal policy and the (principal’s) value
function W : [0, µ] → R amounts to a Markov decision problem. Given discounting, the
optimality equation characterizes both the value and the (set of) optimal policies. For any
ﬁxed U ∈ [0, µ], the optimality equation states the following:
W (U) = sup
ph,pl,uh,ul
{(1− δ) (qph(h− c) + (1− q)pl(l − c))
+ δ (qW (uh) + (1− q)W (ul))} (OBJ)
subject to incentive compatibility and promise keeping, namely,
(1− δ)phh + δuh ≥ (1− δ)plh+ δul, (ICH)
(1− δ)pll + δul ≥ (1− δ)phl + δuh, (ICL)
U = (1− δ) (qphh+ (1− q)pll) + δ (quh + (1− q)ul) , (PK)
(ph, pl, uh, ul) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, µ]× [0, µ].
The incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions are denoted IC (ICH, ICL) and
PK. This optimization program is denoted P.
Our ﬁrst objective is to calculate the value function W as well as the optimal policy.
Obviously, the entire map might not be relevant once we account for the speciﬁc choice of
the initial promise –some promised utilities might simply never arise for any sequence of
reports. Hence, we are also interested in solving for the initial promise U∗, the maximizer
of the value function W .
12Note that not every policy can be represented in this fashion, as the principal does not need to treat two
histories leading to the same continuation utility identically. However, because they are equivalent from the
agent’s viewpoint, the principal’s payoff must be maximized by some policy that does so.
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3.1 Complete Information
Consider the benchmark case in which there is complete information: that is, consider P
without the IC constraints. As the values are i.i.d., we can assume, without loss of generality,
that pl, ph are constant over time. Given U , the principal chooses ph and pl to maximize
qph(h− c) + (1− q)pl(l − c),
subject to U = qphh+ (1− q)pll. It follows easily that
Lemma 1 Under complete information, the optimal policy is
ph =
U
qh
, pl = 0 if U ∈ [0, qh],
ph = 1, pl =
U−qh
(1−q)l if U ∈ [qh, µ].
The value function, denoted W¯ , is equal to
W¯ (U) =


(
1− c
h
)
U if U ∈ [0, qh],(
1− c
l
)
U + cq
(
h
l
− 1) if U ∈ [qh, µ].
Hence, the initial promise (maximizing W¯ ) is U0 := qh.
That is, unless U = qh, the optimal policy (pl, ph) cannot be eﬃcient. To deliver U < qh,
the principal chooses to scale down the probability with which to supply the good when the
value is high, maintaining pl = 0. Similarly, for U > qh, the principal is forced to supply the
good with positive probability even when the value is low to satisfy promise keeping.
While this policy is the only constant optimal one, there are many other (non-constant)
optimal policies. We will encounter some in the sequel.
We call W¯ the complete-information payoﬀ function. It is piecewise linear (see Figure
1). Plainly, it is an upper bound to the value function under incomplete information.
3.2 The Optimal Mechanism
We now solve for the optimal policy under incomplete information in the i.i.d. case. We ﬁrst
provide an informal derivation of the solution. It follows from two observations (formally
established below). First,
The efficient supply choice (pl, ph) = (0, 1) is made “as long as possible.”
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To understand this qualiﬁcation, note that if U = 0 (resp., U = µ), promise keeping allows no
latitude in the choice of probabilities. The good cannot (or must) be supplied, independent
of the report. More generally, if U ∈ [0, (1− δ)qh), it is impossible to supply the good if the
value is high while satisfying promise keeping. In this utility range, the observation must be
interpreted as indicating that the supply choice is as eﬃcient as possible given the restriction
imposed by promise keeping. This implies that a high report leads to a continuation utility
of 0, with the probability of the good being supplied adjusting accordingly. An analogous
interpretation applies to U ∈ (µ− (1− δ)(1− q)l, µ].
These two peripheral intervals vanish as δ → 1 and are ignored for the remainder of
this discussion. For every other promised utility, we claim that it is optimal to make the
(“static”) eﬃcient supply choice. Intuitively, there is never a better time to redeem part of
the promised utility than when the value is high. During such rounds, the interests of the
principal and agent are aligned. Conversely, there cannot be a worse opportunity to repay
the agent what he is due than when the value is low because tomorrow’s value cannot be
lower than today’s.
As trivial as this observation may sound, it already implies that the dynamics of the
ineﬃciencies must be very diﬀerent from those in Battaglini’s model with transfers. Here,
ineﬃciencies are backloaded.
As the supply decision is eﬃcient as long as possible, the high type agent has no incentive
to pretend to be a low type. However,
Incentive compatibility of the low type agent always binds.
Speciﬁcally, without a loss of generality, assume that ICL always binds and disregard ICH .
The reason that the constraint binds is standard: the agent is risk neutral, and the principal’s
payoﬀ must be a concave function of U (otherwise, he could oﬀer the agent a lottery that the
agent would be willing to accept and that would make the principal better oﬀ). Concavity
implies that there is no gain in spreading continuation utilities ul, uh beyond what is required
for ICL to be satisﬁed.
Because we are left with two variables (ul, uh) and two constraints (ICL and PK), we
can immediately solve for the optimal policy. Algebra is not needed. Because the agent is
always willing to state that his value is high, it must be the case that his utility can be
computed as if he followed this reporting strategy, namely,
U = (1− δ)µ+ δuh, or uh = U − (1− δ)µ
δ
.
12
Because U is a weighted average of uh and µ ≥ U , it follows that uh ≤ U . The promised
utility necessarily decreases after a high report. To compute ul, note that the reason that the
high type agent is unwilling to pretend he has a low value is that he receives an incremental
value (1−δ)(h−l) from obtaining the good relative to what would make him merely indiﬀerent
between the two reports. Hence, deﬁning U := q(h− l), it holds that
U = (1− δ)U + δul, or ul = U − (1− δ)U
δ
.
Because U is a weighted average of U and ul, it follows that ul ≤ U if and only if U ≤ U . In
that case, even a low report leads to a decrease in the continuation utility, albeit a smaller
decrease than if the report had been high and the good provided.
The following theorem (proved in the appendix, as are all other results) summarizes this
discussion with the necessary adjustments on the peripheral intervals.
Theorem 1 The unique optimal policy is
pl = max
{
0, 1− µ− U
(1− δ)l
}
, ph = min
{
1,
U
(1− δ)µ
}
.
Given these values of (ph, pl), continuation utilities are
uh =
U − (1− δ)phµ
δ
, ul =
U − (1− δ)(pll + (ph − pl)U)
δ
.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, this policy is not uniquely optimal for U ≤ U .
We now turn to a discussion of the utility dynamics and of the shape of the value function,
which are closely related. This discussion revolves around the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The value function W : [0, µ] → R is continuous and concave on [0, µ], contin-
uously differentiable on (0, µ), linear (and equal to W¯ ) on [0, U ], and strictly concave on
[U, µ]. Furthermore,
lim
U↓0
W ′(U) = 1− c
h
, lim
U↑µ
W ′(U) = 1− c
l
.
Indeed, consider the following functional equation for W that we obtain from Theorem 1
(ignoring again the peripheral intervals for the sake of the discussion):
W (U) = (1− δ)q(h− c) + δqW
(
U − (1− δ)µ
δ
)
+ δ(1− q)W
(
U − (1− δ)U
δ
)
.
Hence, taking for granted the diﬀerentiability of W stated in the lemma,
W ′(U) = qW ′(Uh) + (1− q)W ′(Ul).
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In probabilistic terms, W ′(Un) = E[W ′(Un+1)] given the information at round n. That is, W ′
is a bounded martingale and must therefore converge.13 This martingale was ﬁrst uncovered
by Thomas and Worrall (1990), and hence, we refer to it as the TW-martingale. Because W
is strictly concave on (U, µ), yet uh 6= ul in this range, it follows that the process {Un}∞n=0
must eventually exit this interval. Hence, Un must converge to either U∞ = 0 or µ. However,
note that, because uh < U and ul ≤ U on the interval (0, U ], this interval is a transient
region for the process. Hence, if we began this process in the interval [0, U ], the limit must
be 0 and the TW-martingale implies that W ′ must be constant on this interval – hence the
linearity of W .14
While W ′n := W
′(Un) is a martingale, Un is not. Because the optimal policy yields
Un = (1− δ)qh+ δE[Un+1],
utility drifts up or down (stochastically) according to whether U = Un is above or below
qh. Intuitively, if U > qh, then the ﬂow utility delivered is insuﬃcient to honor the average
promised utility. Hence, the expected continuation utility must be even larger than U .
This raises the question of the initial promise U∗: does it lie above or below qh, and
where does the process converge given this initial value? The answer is provided by the TW-
martingale. Indeed, U∗ is characterized by W ′(U∗) = 0 (uniquely so, given strict concavity
on [U, µ]). Hence,
0 = W ′(U∗) = P[U∞ = 0 | U0 = U∗]W ′(0) +P[U∞ = µ | U0 = U∗]W ′(µ),
where W ′(0) and W ′(µ) are the one-sided derivatives given in the lemma. Hence,
P[U∞ = 0 | U0 = U∗]
P[U∞ = µ | U0 = U∗] =
(c− l)/l
(h− c)/h. (1)
The initial promise is chosen to yield this ratio of absorption probabilities at 0 and µ.
Remarkably, this ratio is independent of the discount factor (despite the discrete nature of
the random walk, the step size of which depends on δ!). Hence, both long-run outcomes are
possible irrespective of how patient the players are. However, depending on the parameters,
U∗ can be above or below qh, the ﬁrst-best initial promise, as is easy to conﬁrm through
examples. In the appendix, we demonstrate that U∗ is decreasing in the cost, which should
13It is bounded because W is concave, and hence, its derivative is bounded by its value at 0 and µ, given
in the lemma.
14This yields multiple optimal policies on this range. As long as the spread is sufficiently large to satisfy
ICL, not so large as to violate ICH , consistent with PK and contained in [0, U ], it is an optimal choice.
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Figure 1: Value function for (δ, l, h, q, c) = (.95, .40, .60, .60, .50).
be clear, because the random walk {Un} only depends on c via the choice of initial promise
U∗ given by (1).
We record this discussion in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The process {Un}∞n=0 (with U0 = U∗) converges to 0 or µ, a.s., with probabilities
given by (1).
3.3 Implementation
As mentioned above, the optimal policy is not a token mechanism because the number of
units the agent receives is not ﬁxed.15 However, the policy admits a very simple indirect
implementation in terms of a budget that can be described as follows. Let f := (1 − δ)U ,
and g := (1− δ)µ− f = (1− δ)l.
Provide the agent with an initial budget of U∗. At the beginning of every round, charge
him a ﬁxed fee equal to f . If the agent asks for the item, supply it and charge a variable
fee g for it. Increase his budget by the interest rate 1
δ
− 1 each round – provided that this is
feasible.
15To be clear, this is not an artifact of discounting: the optimal policy in the finite-horizon undiscounted
version of our model can be derived along the same lines (using the binding ICL and PK constraints), and
the number of units obtained by the agent is also history-dependent in that case.
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This scheme might become infeasible for two reasons. First, his budget might no longer
allow him to pay g for a requested unit. Then, award him whatever fraction his budget
can purchase (at unit price g). Second, his budget might be so close to µ that it is no
longer possible to pay him the interest rate on his budget. Then, return the excess to him,
independent of his report, at a conversion rate that is also given by the price g.
For budgets below U , the agent is “in the red,” and even if he does not buy a unit, his
budget shrinks over time. If his budget is above U , he is “in the black,” and forgoing a unit
increases the budget. When doing so pushes the budget above µ− (1− δ)(1− q)l, the agent
“breaks the bank” and reaches µ in case of another forgoing, which is an absorbing state.
This structure is somewhat reminiscent of results in research on optimal ﬁnancial con-
tracting (see, for instance, Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet, 2007), a literature that
assumes transfers.16 In this literature, one obtains (for some parameters) an upper absorb-
ing boundary (at which the agent receives the ﬁrst-best outcome) and a lower absorbing
boundary (at which the project is terminated). There are several important diﬀerences,
however. Most importantly, the agent is not paid in the intermediate region: promises are
the only source of incentives. In our environment, the agent receives the good if his value is
high, achieving eﬃciency in this intermediate region.
3.4 A Comparison with Token Mechanisms as in Jackson and Son-
nenschein (2007)
A discussion of the relationship of our results to those in environments with transfers is
relegated to Section 4.5 because the environment considered in Section 4 is the counterpart
to Battaglini (2005). However, because token mechanisms are typically introduced in i.i.d.
environments, we make a few observations concerning the connection between our results
and those of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) here to explain why our dynamic analysis is
substantially diﬀerent from the static one with many copies.
There are two conceptually distinct issues. First, are token mechanisms optimal? Second,
is the problem static or dynamic? For the purpose of asymptotic analysis (when either the
discount factor tends to 1 or the number of equally weighted copies T <∞ tends to inﬁnity),
the distinctions are blurred: token mechanisms are optimal in the limit, whether the problem
is static or dynamic. Because the emphasis in Jackson and Sonnenschein is on asymptotic
16There are other important differences in the set-up. They allow two instruments: downsizing the firm
and payments. Additionally, this is a moral hazard-type problem because the agent can divert resources
from a risky project, reducing the likelihood that it succeeds during a given period.
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analysis, they focus on a static model and on a token mechanism and derive a rate of
convergence for this mechanism (namely, the loss relative to the ﬁrst-best outcome is of the
order O(1/√T )), and they discuss the extension of their results to the dynamic case. We may
then cast the comparison in terms of the agent’s knowledge. In Jackson and Sonnenschein,
the agent is a prophet (in the sense of stochastic processes, he knows the entire realization
of the process from the beginning), whereas in our environment, the agent is a forecaster
(the process of his reports must be predictable with respect to the realized values up to the
current date).
Not only are token mechanisms asymptotically optimal regardless of whether the agent
is a prophet or a forecaster, but also, the agent’s information plays no role if we restrict
attention to token mechanisms in a binary-type environment absent discounting. With
binary values and a ﬁxed number of units, it makes no diﬀerence whether one knows the
realized sequence in advance. Forgoing low-value items as long as the budget does not allow
all remaining units to be claimed is not costly, as subsequent units cannot be worth even
less. Similarly, accepting high-value items cannot be a mistake.
However, the optimal mechanism in our environment is not a token mechanism. A report
not only aﬀects whether the agent obtains the current unit but also aﬀects the total number
he obtains.17 Furthermore, the optimal mechanism when the agent is a prophet is not a token
one (even in the ﬁnite undiscounted horizon case). The optimal mechanism does not simply
ask the agent to select a ﬁxed number of copies that he would like but oﬀers him a menu
that trades oﬀ the risk in obtaining the units he claims are low or high and the expected
number that he receives.18 The agent’s private information pertains not only to whether a
given unit has a high value but also to how many units are high. Token mechanisms do not
elicit any information in this regard. Because the prophet has more information than the
forecaster, the optimal mechanisms are distinct.
The question of how the two mechanisms compare (in terms of average eﬃciency loss)
is ambiguous a priori. Because the prophet has more information regarding the number
of high-value items, the mechanism must satisfy more incentive-compatibility constraints
(which harms welfare) but might induce a better ﬁt between the number of units he actually
receives and the number he should receive. Indeed, it is not diﬃcult to construct examples
(say, for T = 3) in which the comparison could go either way according to the parameters.
However, asymptotically, the comparison is clear, as the next lemma states.
17To be clear, token mechanisms are not optimal even without discounting.
18The characterization of the optimal mechanism in the case of a prophetic agent is somewhat peripheral
to our analysis and is thus omitted.
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Lemma 4 It holds that
|W (U∗)− q(h− c)| = O(1− δ).
In the case of a prophetic agent, the average loss converges to zero at rate O(√1− δ).
With a prophet, the rate is no better than with token mechanisms. Token mechanisms
achieve rate O(√1− δ) precisely because they do not attempt to elicit the number of high
units. By the central limit theorem, this implies that a token mechanism is incorrect by
an order of O(√1− δ). The lemma indicates that the cost of incentive compatibility is
suﬃciently strong that the optimal mechanism performs little better, eliminating only a
fraction of this ineﬃciency.19 The forecaster’s relative lack of information serves the principal.
Because the former knows values only one round in advance, he gives the information away
for free until absorption. His private information regarding the number of high units being
of the order (1 − δ), the overall ineﬃciency is of the same order. Both rates are tight (see
the proof of Lemma 4): indeed, were the agent to hold private information for the initial
period only, there would already be an ineﬃciency of the order 1− δ, and so welfare cannot
converge faster than at that rate.
Hence, when interacting with a forecaster rather than a prophet, there is a real loss in
using a token mechanism instead of the budget mechanism described above.
4 The General Markov Model
We now return to the general model in which types are persistent rather than independent.
As an initial exercise, consider the case of perfect persistence ρh = ρl = 0. If types
never change, there is simply no possibility for the principal to use future allocations as an
instrument to elicit truth-telling. We revert to the static problem for which the solution is
to either always provide the good (if µ ≥ c) or never do so.
This case suggests that persistence plays an ambiguous role a priori. Because current
types assign diﬀerent probabilities of being (for example) high types tomorrow, one might
hope that tying promised future utility to current reports might facilitate truth-telling. How-
ever, the case of perfectly persistent types suggests that correlation diminishes the scope for
using future allocations as “transfers.” Utilities might still be separable over time, but the
19This result might be surprising given Cohn’s (2010) “improvement” upon Jackson and Sonnenschein.
However, while Jackson and Sonnenschein cover our set-up, Cohn does not and features more instruments
at the principal’s disposal. See also Eilat and Pauzner (2011) for an optimal mechanism in a related setting.
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current type aﬀects both ﬂow and continuation utility. Deﬁnite comparative statics are
obtained in the continuous time limit, see Section 5.1.
The techniques that served us well with independent values are no longer useful. We
will not be able to rely on martingale techniques. Worse, ex ante utility is no longer a
valid state variable. To understand why, note that with independent types, an agent of a
given type can evaluate his continuation utility based only on current type, probabilities of
trade as a function of his report, and promised utility tomorrow as a function of his report.
However, if today’s type is correlated with tomorrow’s type, how can the agent evaluate
his continuation utility without knowing how the principal intends to implement it? This
is problematic because the agent can deviate, unbeknown to the principal, in which case
the continuation utility computed by the principal, given his incorrect belief regarding the
agent’s type tomorrow, is not the same as the continuation utility under the agent’s belief.
However, conditional on the agent’s type tomorrow, his type today carries no information
on future types by the Markovian assumption. Hence, tomorrow’s promised ex interim
utilities suﬃce for the agent to compute his utility today regardless of whether he deviates;
that is, we must specify his promised utility tomorrow conditional on each possible report at
that time. Of course, his type tomorrow is not observable. Hence, we must use the utility he
receives from reporting his type tomorrow, conditional on truthful reporting. This creates
no diﬃculty, as on path, the agent has an incentive to truthfully report his type tomorrow.
Hence, he does so after having lied during the previous round (conditional on his current
type and his previous report, his previous type does not aﬀect the decision problem he faces).
That is, the one-shot deviation principle holds here: when a player considers lying, there is
no loss in assuming that he will report truthfully tomorrow. Hence, the promised utility pair
that we use corresponds to his actual possible continuation utilities if he plays optimally in
the continuation regardless of whether he reports truthfully today. We are obviously not the
ﬁrst to highlight the necessity of using as a state variable the vector of ex interim utilities,
given a report today, as opposed to the ex ante utility when types are serially correlated. See
Townsend (1982), Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Doepke and
Townsend (2006) and Zhang and Zenios (2008). Hence, to use dynamic programming, we
must include as state variables the pair of utilities that must be delivered today as a function
of the report. Nevertheless, this is insuﬃcient to evaluate the payoﬀ to the principal. Given
such a pair of utilities, we must also specify his belief regarding the agent’s type. Let φ
denote the probability that he assigns the high type. This belief can take only three values
depending on whether this is the initial round or whether the previous report was high or
low. Nonetheless, we treat φ as an arbitrary element in the unit interval.
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Another complication arises from the fact that the principal’s belief depends on the
history. For this belief, the last report is suﬃcient.
4.1 The Program
As discussed above, the principal’s optimization program, cast as a dynamic programming
problem, requires three state variables: the belief of the principal, φ = P[v = h] ∈ [0, 1],
and the pair of (ex interim) utilities that the principal delivers as a function of the current
report, Uh, Ul. The highest utility µh (resp., µl) that can be given to a player whose type is
high (or low) delivered by always supplying the good solves
µh = (1− δ)h + δ(1− ρh)µh + δρhµl, µl = (1− δ)l + δ(1− ρl)µl + δρlµh;
that is,
µh = h− δρh(h− l)
1− δ + δ(ρh + ρl) , µl = l +
δρl(h− l)
1− δ + δ(ρh + ρl) .
We note that
µh − µl = 1− δ
1− δ + δ(ρh + ρl)(h− l).
The gap between the maximum utilities as a function of the type decreases in δ, vanishing
as δ → 1.
A policy is now a pair (ph, pl) : R
2 → [0, 1]2 mapping the current utility vector U =
(Uh, Ul) onto the probability with which the good is supplied as a function of the report and
a pair (U(h), U(l)) : R2 → R2 mapping U onto the promised utilities (Uh(h), Ul(h)) if the
report is h and (Uh(l), Ul(l)) if it is l. These deﬁnitions abuse notation, as the domain of
(U(h), U(l)) should be those utility vectors that are feasible and incentive-compatible.
Deﬁne the function W : [0, µh] × [0, µl] × [0, 1] → R ∪ {−∞} that solves the following
program for all U ∈ [0, µh]× [0, µl], and φ ∈ [0, 1]:
W (U, φ) = sup {φ ((1− δ)ph(h− c) + δW (U(h), 1− ρh))
+ (1− φ) ((1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW (U(l), ρl))} ,
over pl, ph ∈ [0, 1], and U(h), U(l) ∈ [0, µh]× [0, µl] subject to promise keeping and incentive
compatibility, namely,
Uh = (1− δ)phh+ δ(1− ρh)Uh(h) + δρhUl(h) (2)
≥ (1− δ)plh+ δ(1− ρh)Uh(l) + δρhUl(l), (3)
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and
Ul = (1− δ)pll + δ(1− ρl)Ul(l) + δρlUh(l) (4)
≥ (1− δ)phl + δ(1− ρl)Ul(h) + δρlUh(h), (5)
with the convention that supW = −∞ whenever the feasible set is empty. Note that W
is concave on its domain (by the linearity of the constraints in the promised utilities). An
optimal policy is a map from (U, φ) into (ph, pl, U(h), U(l)) that achieves the supremum for
some W .
4.2 Complete Information
Proceeding as with independent values, we brieﬂy derive the solution under complete infor-
mation, that is, dropping (3) and (5). Write W¯ for the resulting value function. Ignoring
promises, the eﬃcient policy is to supply the good if and only if the type is h. Let v∗h (resp.,
v∗l ) denote the utility that a high (low) type obtains under this policy. The pair (v
∗
h, v
∗
l )
satisﬁes
v∗h = (1− δ)h + δ(1− ρh)v∗h + δρhv∗l , v∗l = δ(1− ρl)v∗l + δρlv∗h,
which yields
v∗h =
h(1− δ(1− ρl))
1− δ(1− ρh − ρl) , v
∗
l =
δhρl
1− δ(1− ρh − ρl) .
When a high type’s promised utility Uh is in [0, v
∗
h], the principal supplies the good only if
the type is high. Therefore, the payoﬀ is Uh(1 − c/h). When Uh ∈ (v∗h, µh], the principal
always supplies the good if the type is high. To fulﬁll the promised utility, the principal also
produces the good when the agent’s type is low. The payoﬀ is v∗h(1−c/h)+(Uh−v∗h)(1−c/l).
We proceed analogously given Ul (notice that the problems of delivering Uh and Ul are
uncoupled). In summary, W¯ (U, φ) is given by

φUh(h−c)
h
+ (1− φ)Ul(h−c)
h
if U ∈ [0, v∗h]× [0, v∗l ],
φUh(h−c)
h
+ (1− φ)
(
v∗
l
(h−c)
h
+
(Ul−v∗l )(l−c)
l
)
if U ∈ [0, v∗h]× [v∗l , µl],
φ
(
v∗
h
(h−c)
h
+
(Uh−v∗h)(l−c)
l
)
+ (1− φ)Ul(h−c)
h
if U ∈ [v∗h, µl]× [0, v∗l ],
φ
(
v∗
h
(h−c)
h
+
(Uh−v∗h)(l−c)
l
)
+ (1− φ)
(
v∗
l
(h−c)
h
+
(Ul−v∗l )(l−c)
l
)
if U ∈ [v∗h, µl]× [v∗l , µl].
For future purposes, note that the derivative of W (diﬀerentiable except at Uh = v
∗
h and
Ul = v
∗
l ) is in the interval [1− c/l, 1− c/h], as expected. The latter corresponds to the most
eﬃcient utility allocation, whereas the former corresponds to the most ineﬃcient allocation.
In fact, W is piecewise linear (a “tilted pyramid”) with a global maximum at v∗ = (v∗h, v
∗
l ).
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4.3 Feasible and Incentive-Feasible Payoffs
One diﬃculty in using ex interim utilities as state variables rather than ex ante utility is that
the dimensionality of the problem increases with the cardinality of the type set. Another
related diﬃculty is that it is not obvious which vectors of utilities are feasible given the
incentive constraints. Promising to assign all future units to the agent in the event that
his current report is high while assigning none if this report is low is simply not incentive
compatible.
The set of feasible utility pairs (that is, the largest bounded set of vectors U such that
(2) and (4) can be satisﬁed with continuation vectors in the set itself) is easy to describe.
Because the two promise keeping equations are uncoupled, it is simply the set [0, µh]× [0, µl]
itself (as was already implicit in Section 4.2).
What is challenging is to solve for the incentive-compatible, feasible (in short, incentive-
feasible) utility pairs: these are ex interim utilities for which we can ﬁnd probabilities and
pairs of promised utilities tomorrow that make it optimal for the agent to report his value
truthfully such that these promised utility pairs tomorrow satisfy the same property.
Definition 1 The incentive-feasible set, V ∈ R2, is the set of ex interim utilities in round
0 that are obtained for some incentive-compatible policy.
It is standard to show that V is the largest bounded set such that for each U ∈ V there
exists ph, pl ∈ [0, 1] and two pairs U(h), U(l) ∈ V solving (2)–(5).20
Our ﬁrst step toward solving for the optimal mechanism is to solve for V . To obtain some
intuition regarding its structure, let us review some of its elements. Clearly, 0 ∈ V, µ :=
(µh, µl) ∈ V . It suﬃces to never or always supply the unit, independent of the reports,
which is incentive compatible.21 More generally, for some integer m ≥ 0, the principal can
supply the unit for the ﬁrst m rounds, independent of the reports, and never supply the
unit after. We refer to such policies as pure frontloaded policies because they deliver a given
number of units as quickly as possible. More generally, a (possibly mixed) frontloaded policy
is one that randomizes over two pure frontloaded policies with consecutive integers m,m+1.
20Clearly, incentive-feasibility is closely related to self-generation (see Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990),
though it pertains to the different types of a single agent rather than to different players in the game. The
distinction is not merely a matter of interpretation because a high type can become a low type and vice-
versa, which represents a situation with no analogue in repeated games. Nonetheless, the proof of this
characterization is identical.
21With some abuse, we write µ ∈ R2, as it is the natural extension as an upper bound of the feasible set
of µ ∈ R.
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Similarly, we deﬁne a pure backloaded policy as one that does not supply the good for the
ﬁrst m rounds but does afterward, independent of the reports. (Mixed backloaded policies
being deﬁned in the obvious way.)
Suppose that we ﬁx a backloaded and a frontloaded policy such that the high-value agent
is indiﬀerent between the two. Then, the low-value agent surely prefers the backloaded policy.
The backloaded policy aﬀords him “more time” to switch from his (initial) low value to a
high value. Hence, given Uh ∈ (0, µh), the utility Ul obtained by the backloaded policy that
awards Uh to the high type is higher than the utility Ul of the frontloaded policy that also
yields Uh.
The utility pairs corresponding to backloading and frontloading are easily solved because
they obey simple recursions. First, for ν ≥ 0, let
uνh = δ
νµh − δν(1− q)(µh − µl)(1− κν), (6)
uνl = δ
νµl + δ
νq(µh − µl)(1− κν), (7)
and set uν := (uνh, u
ν
l ). Second, for ν ≥ 0, let
uνh = (1− δν)µh + δν(1− q)(µh − µl)(1− κν), (8)
uνl = (1− δν)µl − δνq(µh − µl)(1− κν), (9)
and set uν := (uνh, u
ν
l ). The sequence u
ν is decreasing (in both its arguments) as ν in-
creases, with u0 = µ and with limν→∞ uν = 0. Similarly, uν is increasing, with u0 = 0 and
limν→∞ uν = µ.
Backloading not only is better than frontloading for the low-value agent but also ﬁxes
the high-value agent’s utility. These policies yield the best and worst utilities. Formally,
Lemma 5 It holds that
V = co{uν , uν : ν ≥ 0}.
That is, V is a polygon with a countable inﬁnity of vertices (and two accumulation points).
See Figure 2 for an illustration. It is easily veriﬁed that
lim
ν→∞
uν+1l − uνl
uν+1h − uνh
= lim
ν→∞
uν+1l − uνl
uν+1h − uνh
= 1.
When the switching time ν is large, the change in utility from increasing this time has an
impact on the agent’s utility that is essentially independent of his initial type. Hence, the
slopes of the boundaries are less than 1 and approach 1 as ν →∞. Because (µl− v∗l )/(µh−
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Figure 2: The set V for parameters (δ, ρh, ρl, l, h) = (9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1).
v∗h) > 1, the vector v
∗ is outside V . For any φ, the complete-information value function
W¯ (U, φ) increases as we vary U within V toward its lower boundary, either horizontally or
vertically. This pattern should not be particularly surprising. Due to private information,
the low-type agent derives information rents such that if the high-type agent’s utility were
ﬁrst-best, the low-type agent’s utility would be too high. It is instructive to study how the
shape of V varies with persistence. When κ = 0 and values are independent over time, the
lower type agent prefers to receive a larger fraction (or probability) of the good tomorrow
rather than today (adjusting for discounting) but has no preference over later times. The case
is analogous for the high type agent. As a result, all the vertices {uν}∞ν=1 (resp., {uν}∞ν=1) are
aligned and V is a parallelogram with vertices 0, µ, u1 and u1. As κ increases, the imbalance
between type utilities increases and the set V ﬂattens. In the limit of perfect persistence,
the low-type agent no longer feels diﬀerently about frontloading vs. backloading because no
amount of time allows his type to change. See Figure 3.
The structure of V relies on the assumption κ ≥ 0. If types were negatively correlated
over time, then frontloading and backloading would not be policies spanning the boundary
of V . This fact is easily seen by considering the case in which there is perfect negative serial
correlation. Then, providing the unit if only if the round is odd (even) favors (hurts) the low-
24
Uh
Independence
Strong persistence
Ul
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
bb
b
b
b
bb
bbbb bbbbbbbbbbbb
b
b
bb
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b b b
b b
b b
b b
b b b
b b b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
bbbbbbbbbbbb
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b b
b b
b b
b b b
b
b
Figure 3: Impact of persistence, as measured by κ ≥ 0.
type agent relative to the high-type agent. These two policies achieve the extreme points
of V . According to whether higher or lower values of Uh are being considered, the other
boundary points combine such alternation with frontloading or backloading. A negative
correlation thus requires a separate (but analogous) treatment, motivating our focus on
κ ≥ 0.
Importantly, frontloading and backloading are not the only ways to achieve boundary
payoﬀs. It is relatively clear that the lower locus corresponds to policies that (starting from
this locus) assign as high a probability as possible to the good being supplied for every
high report while promising continuation utilities that make ICL always bind. Similarly, the
upper boundary corresponds to those policies that assign as low a probability as possible
to the good being supplied for low reports while promising continuation utilities that make
ICH always bind. Frontloading and backloading are representative examples of each class.
4.4 The Optimal Mechanism
Not every incentive-feasible utility vector is on path given the optimal policy. Irrespective
of the sequence of reports, some vectors simply never arise. While it is necessary to solve for
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the value function and optimal policy on the entire domain V , we ﬁrst focus on the subset
of V that is relevant given the optimal initial promise and resulting dynamics. We relegate
discussion of the optimal policy for other utility vectors to the end of this section.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of utility on the lower locus.
This subset is the lower locus –the polygonal chain spanned by pure frontloading. Fur-
thermore, two observations from the i.i.d. case remain valid. First, the eﬃcient choice is
made as long as possible given feasibility, and second, the promises are chosen so the agent
is indiﬀerent between the two reports when his type is low.
To understand why such a policy yields utilities on the “frontloading” boundary (as
mentioned at the end of Section 4.3), note that, because the low type is indiﬀerent between
the two reports, the agent is willing to always report high irrespective of his type. Because
the principal then supplies the good, from the agent’s perspective, the pair of utilities can
be computed as if frontloading were the policy being implemented.
From the principal’s perspective, however, it is important that this is not the actual
policy. As in the i.i.d. case (a special case of the analysis), the payoﬀ is higher under the
eﬃcient policy. Making the eﬃcient choice, even if it involves delay, increases the principal’s
payoﬀ.
Hence, after a high report, as in the i.i.d. case, continuation utility declines.22 Speciﬁcally,
22Because the lower boundary is upward sloping, the ex interim utilities of both types vary in the same
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U(h) is computed as under frontloading as the solution to the following system:
Uv = (1− δ)v + δEv[U(h)], v = l, h,
where U is given. Here, Ev[U(h)] is the expectation of the utility vector U(h) provided that
the current type is v (e.g., for v = h, Ev[U(h)] = ρhUl(h) + (1− ρh)Uh(h)).
The promised U(l) does not admit such an explicit formula because it is speciﬁed by
ICL and the requirement that it lies on the lower boundary. In fact, U(l) might be lower
or higher than U (see Figure 4) depending on where U lies on the boundary. If it is high
enough, U(l) is higher; conversely, under certain conditions, U(l) is lower than U when U
is low enough.23 The condition has a simple geometric interpretation: if the half-open line
segment (0, v∗] intersects the boundary,24 then U(l) is lower than U if and only if U lies
below U .25 However, if there is no such intersection, then U(l) is always higher than U . This
intersection exists if and only if
h− l
l
>
1− δ
δρl
. (10)
Hence, U(l) is higher than U (for all U) if the low-type persistence is suﬃciently high, which
is intuitive. Utility declines even after a low report if U is so low that even the low-type
agent expects to have suﬃciently soon and often a high value such that the eﬃcient policy
would yield too high a utility. When the low-type persistence is high, this does not occur.26
As in the i.i.d. case, the principal is able to achieve the complete-information payoﬀ if and
only if U ≤ U (or U = µ).
We summarize this discussion with the following theorem, a special case of the next.
Theorem 2 The optimal policy consists of the constrained-efficient policy
pl = max
{
0, 1− µl − Ul
(1− δ)l
}
, ph = min
{
1,
Uh
(1− δ)h
}
in addition to a (specific) initially promised U0 > U on the lower boundary of V and choices
(U(h), U(l)) on this lower boundary such that ICL always binds.
way. Accordingly, we use terms such as “higher” or “lower” utility and write U < U ′ for the component-wise
order.
23As in the i.i.d. case, U(l) is always higher than U(h).
24This line has the equation Ul =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)
Uh.
25With some abuse, we write U ∈ R2 because it is the natural extension of U ∈ R as introduced in Section
3. Additionally, we set U = 0 if the intersection does not exist.
26This condition is satisfied in the i.i.d. case due to our assumption that δ > l/µ.
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While the implementation in the i.i.d. case is described in terms of a “utility budget,” in-
spired by the use of (ex ante) utility as a state variable, the analysis of the Markov case
strongly suggests the use of a more concrete metric – the number of units that the agent is
entitled to claim in a row with “no questions asked.” The utility vectors on the boundary
are parameterized by the number of rounds required to reach 0 under frontloading. Due to
integer issues, we denote such a policy by a pair (m, λ) ∈ (N0 ∪ {∞}) × [0, 1), with the
interpretation that the good is supplied with probability λ for m rounds and complementary
probability 1 − λ for m + 1 rounds, and write Uh(m, λ), Ul(m, λ). If m = ∞, the good is
always supplied, yielding utility µ.
We may think of the optimal policy as follows. During a given round m, the agent is
promised (mn, λn). If the agent asks for the unit (and this is feasible, that is, mn ≥ 1), the
next promise (mn+1, λn+1) is the solution to
Ul(mn, λn)− (1− δ)l
δ
= El
[
Uvt+1(mn+1, λn+1)
]
, (11)
where El
[
Uvn+1(mn+1, λn+1)
]
= (1 − ρl)Ul(mn+1, λn+1) + ρlUh(mn+1, λn+1) is the expected
utility from tomorrow’s promise (mn+1, λn+1) given that today’s type is low. If mn < 1
and the agent claims to be high, he then receives the unit with probability q˜, which solves
Ul(mn, λn)− q˜(1− δ)l = 0.) However, claiming to be low simply leads to the revised promise
Ul(mn, λn)
δ
= El
[
Uvn+1(mn+1, λn+1)
]
, (12)
provided that there exists a (ﬁnite) mn+1 and λn+1 ∈ [0, 1) that solve this equation.27 The
policy described by (11)–(12) reduces to that described in Section 3.3 (a special case of the
Markovian case). The policy described in the i.i.d. case is obtained by taking the expectations
of these dynamics with respect to today’s type.
It is perhaps surprising that the optimal policy can be derived but less surprising that
comparative statics are diﬃcult to obtain except by numerical simulations. By scaling both
ρl and ρh by a common factor, p ≥ 0, one varies the persistence of the value without aﬀecting
the invariant probability q, and hence, the value µ is also unaﬀected. Numerically, it appears
that a decrease in persistence (an increase in p) leads to a higher payoﬀ. When p = 0, types
never change, and we are left with a static problem (for the parameters chosen here, it is best
not to provide the good). When p increases, types change more rapidly, and the promised
utility becomes a frictionless currency.
27This is impossible if the promised (mn, λn) is already too large (formally, if the corresponding pay-
off vector (Uh(m,λ), Ul(m,λ) ∈ Vh). In that case, the good is provided with the probability that solves
Ul(mn,λn)−q˜(1−δ)l
δ
= El
[
Uvn+1(∞)
]
.
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As mentioned above, these comparative statics are merely suggested by simulations. As
promised utility varies as a random walk with unequal step size on a grid that is itself
a polygonal chain, there is little hope of establishing this result more formally here. To
derive a result along these lines, see Section 5.1. Nonetheless, note that it is not persistence
but positive correlation that is detrimental. It is tempting to believe that any type of
persistence is bad because it endows the agent with private information that pertains not
only to today’s value but also to tomorrow’s, and eliciting private information is usually
costly in information economics. However, conditional on his knowledge regarding today’s
type, the agent’s information regarding his future type is known (unlike in the case of a
prophetic agent with i.i.d. values). Note that with perfectly negatively correlated types,
the complete information payoﬀ would be easy to achieve: oﬀer the agent a choice between
receiving the good in all odd or all even rounds. As δ > l/h (in fact, we assumed that
δ > l/µ), the low-type agent would tell the truth. Just as in the case of a lower discount
rate, a more negative correlation (or less positive correlation) makes future promises more
eﬀective incentives because preference misalignment is shorter-lived.
It is immediately apparent that given any initial choice of U0 /∈ V ∪ {µ}, ﬁnitely many
consecutive reports of l (or h) suﬃce for the promised utility to reach µ (or 0). As a
result, both long-run outcomes have strictly positive probability under the optimal policy
for any optimal initial choice. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, this implies that absorption
occurs almost surely. As in the i.i.d. model, the ex ante utility computed under the invariant
distribution is a random process that drifts upward if and only if qUl+(1−q)Uh ≥ qh, where
the right-hand side is the ﬂow utility under the eﬃcient policy. However, we are unable to
derive the absorption probabilities beginning from U0 because the Markov model admits no
analogue to the TW-martingale.
4.5 A Comparison with Transfers as in Battaglini (2005)
As mentioned above, our model can be regarded as the no-transfer counterpart of Battaglini
(2005).
Initially, the diﬀerence in results is striking. A main ﬁnding of Battaglini, “no distortion
at the top,” has no counterpart in this model. With transfers, eﬃcient provision occurs
forever once the agent is revealed to be of the high type. Additionally, as noted above, with
transfers, even along the history in which eﬃciency is not achieved in ﬁnite time, namely, an
uninterrupted string of low reports, eﬃciency is asymptotically approached. As explained
above, we necessarily obtain (with probability one) an ineﬃcient outcome, which can be
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implemented without further reports. Moreover, both outcomes (providing the good forever
and never providing it again) can arise. In summary, in the presence of transfers, ineﬃciencies
are frontloaded as much as possible, whereas here, they are backloaded to the greatest extent
possible.
The diﬀerence can be understood as follows. First, and importantly, Battaglini’s results
rely on revenue maximization being the objective function. With transfers, eﬃciency is
trivial: simply charge c whenever the good must be supplied.
Once revenue maximization becomes the objective, the incentive constraints reverse with
transfers: it is no longer the low type who would like to mimic the high type but the high
type who would like to avoid paying his entire value for the good by claiming he is a low type.
To avoid this, the high type must be given information rents, and his incentive constraint
becomes binding. Ideally, the principal would like to charge for these rents before the agent
has private information while the expected value of these rents to the agent remains common
knowledge. When types are i.i.d., this poses no diﬃculty, and these rents can be expropriated
one round ahead of time. With correlation, however, diﬀerent types of agents value these
rents diﬀerently, as their likelihood of being high in the future depends on their current type.
However, when considering information rents suﬃciently far in the future, the initial type
exerts a minimal eﬀect on the conditional expectation of the value of these rents. Hence, the
value can “almost” be extracted. As a result, it is in the principal’s best interest to maximize
the surplus and oﬀer a nearly eﬃcient contract at all dates that are suﬃciently far away.
We observe that money plays two roles. First, because it is an instrument that allows
promises to “clear” on the spot without allocative distortions, it prevents the occurrence of
backloaded ineﬃciencies – a poor substitute for money in this regard. Even if payments could
not be made “in advance,” this would suﬃce to restore eﬃciency if that were the objective.
Another role of money, as highlighted by Battaglini, is that it allows value to be transferred
from the agent to the principal before information becomes private. Hence, information
rents no longer impede eﬃciency, at least with respect to the remote future. These future
ineﬃciencies can be eliminated such that ineﬃciencies only arise over the short run.
A plausible intermediate case arises when money is available but the agent is protected
by limited liability, meaning that payments can only be made in one direction: from the
principal to the agent. The principal strives to maximize the social surplus net of any
payments made.28 In this case, we demonstrate in the appendix (see Lemma 11) that no
transfers are made if (and only if) c − l < l. This condition can be interpreted as follows:
28If payments do not matter for the principal, efficiency is easily achieved because he would pay c to the
agent if and only if the report is low and nothing otherwise.
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c− l is the cost to the principal of incurring one ineﬃciency (supplying the good when the
type is low), whereas l is the cost to the agent of forgoing a low-unit value. Hence, if it is
costlier to buy oﬀ the agent than to supply the good when the value is low, the principal
prefers to never use money as an instrument and to follow the optimal policy absent any
money.
4.6 The General Solution
Theorem 2 follows from the analysis of the optimal policy on the entire domain V . Because
only those values in V along the lower boundary are relevant, the reader might elect to skip
this subsection, which completely solves the program in Section 4.1.
First, we further divide V into subsets and introduce two sequences of utility vectors for
this purpose. Given U , deﬁne the sequence {vν}ν≥1 by
vνh = δ
ν ((1− q)U l + qUh + (1− q)κν(Uh − U l)) , vνl = δν ((1− q)U l + qUh − qκν(Uh − U l)) ,
and deﬁne
V = co{{0} ∪ {vν}ν≥0}. (13)
See Figure 5. Note that V has a non-empty interior if and only if ρl is suﬃciently large (see
(10)). This set is the domain of utilities for which the complete information payoﬀ can be
achieved, as stated below.
Lemma 6 For all U ∈ V ∪ {µ} and all φ,
W (U, φ) = W¯ (U, φ).
Conversely, if U /∈ V ∪ {µ}, then W (U, φ) < W¯ (U, φ) for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
Second, we deﬁne uˆν := (uˆνh, uˆ
ν
l ), ν ≥ 0 as follows:
uˆνh = µh − (1− δ)h− δν+1
(
(1− q)l + qh+ (1− q)κν+1(µh − µl)
)
,
uˆνl = µl − (1− δ)l − δν+1
(
(1− q)l + qh− qκν+1(µh − µl)
)
.
We note that uˆ0 = 0 and uˆν is an increasing sequence (in both coordinates) contained in
V , where limν→∞ uˆν = u¯1. The ordered sequence {uˆν}ν≥0 deﬁnes a polygonal chain P that
divides V \ V into two further subsets, Vt and Vb, consisting of those points in V \V that lie
above or below P . It is readily veriﬁed that the points U on P are precisely those for which,
assuming ICH, the resulting U(l) lies exactly on the lower boundary of V . We also let Pb,
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Pt be the (closure of the) polygonal chains deﬁned by {uν}ν≥0 and {uν}ν≥0 that correspond
to the lower and upper boundaries of V .
We now deﬁne a policy (which, as we will see below, is optimal) ignoring for the present
the choice of the initial promise.
Definition 2 For all U ∈ V , set
pl = max
{
0, 1− µl − Ul
(1− δ)l
}
, ph = min
{
1,
Uh
(1− δ)h
}
, (14)
and
U(h) ∈ Pb, U(l) ∈

Pb if U ∈ VbPt if U ∈ Pt.
Furthermore, if U ∈ Vt, U(l) is chosen such that ICH binds.
For each continuation utility vector U(h) or U(l), this yields one constraint (either an in-
centive constraint or a constraint that the utility vector lies on one of the boundaries). In
addition to the two promise keeping equations, this yields four constraints, which uniquely
deﬁne the pair of points (U(h), U(l)). It is readily veriﬁed that the policy and choices of
U(l), U(h) also imply that ICL binds for all U ∈ Pb. A surprising property of this policy
is that it is independent of the principal’s belief. That is, the principal’s belief regarding
the agent’s value is irrelevant to the optimal policy given the promised utility. However,
the initial choice of utility on the lower boundary depends on this belief, as does the pay-
oﬀ. However, the monotonicity properties of the value function with respect to utilities are
suﬃciently strong and uniform that the constraints specify the policy.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of the optimal policy. Given any promised utility vector
in V , the vector (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is played (unless U is too close to 0 or µ), and promised
utilities depend on the report. A report of l shifts the utility to the right (toward higher
utilities), whereas a report of h shifts utility to the left and toward the lower boundary.
Below the polygonal chain, the l report also shifts us to the lower boundary (and ICL
binds), whereas above the chain, ICH binds. In fact, note that if the utility vector is on the
upper boundary, the continuation utility after l remains there.
For completeness, we also deﬁne the subsets over which promise keeping prevents the
eﬃcient choices (ph, pl) = (1, 0) from being made. Let Vh be {(Uh, Ul) : (Uh, Ul) ∈ V, Ul ≥ u1l }
and Vl be {(Uh, Ul) : (Uh, Ul) ∈ V, Uh ≤ u1h}. It is easily veriﬁed that (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is
feasible at U given promise keeping if and only if U ∈ V \ (Vh ∪ Vl).
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Figure 5: The set V and the optimal policy for (δ, ρh, ρl, l, h) = (9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1).
Theorem 3 Fix U0 ∈ V ; given U0, the policy stated above is optimal. The initial promise
U∗ is in Pb ∩ (V \ V ), with U∗ increasing in the principal’s prior belief.
Furthermore, the value function W (Uh, Ul, φ) is weakly increasing in Uh along the rays
x = φUh + (1− φ)Ul for any φ ∈ {1− ρh, ρl}.
Given that U∗ ∈ Pb and given the structure of the optimal policy, the promised utility
vector never leaves Pb. It is also simple to verify that, as in the i.i.d. case (and by the same
arguments), the (one-sided) derivative ofW approaches the derivative of W¯ as U approaches
either µ or the set V . As a result, the initial promise U∗ is strictly interior.
5 Extensions
Two modeling choices deserve discussion. First, we have opted for a discrete time framework
because it embeds the case of independent values – a natural starting point for which there
is no counterpart in continuous time. However, this choice comes at a price. By varying
the discount factor, we change both the patience of the players and the rate at which types
change with independent values. This is not necessarily the case with Markovian types, but
the analytical diﬃculties prevent us from deriving deﬁnitive comparative statics, a deﬁciency
that we remedy below by resorting to continuous time.
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Second, we have assumed that the agent’s value is binary. As is well known (see Battaglini
and Lamba, 2014, for instance), it is diﬃcult to make progress with more types, even with
transfers, unless strong assumptions are imposed. In the i.i.d. case, this is nonetheless
possible. Below, we consider the case of a continuum of types, which allows us to evaluate
the robustness of our various ﬁndings.
5.1 Continuous Time
To make further progress, we examine the limiting stochastic process of utility and payoﬀ as
transitions that are scaled according to the usual Poisson limit, when variable round length,
∆ > 0, is taken to 0, at the same time as the transition probabilities ρh = λh∆, ρl = λl∆.
That is, we let (vt)t≥0 be a continuous time Markov chain (by deﬁnition, a right-continuous
process) with values in {h, l}, initial probability q of h, and parameters λh, λl > 0. Let T0,
T1, T2, . . . be the corresponding random times at which the value switches (setting T0 = 0 if
the initial state is l such that, by convention, vt = l on any interval [T2k, T2k+1)). The initial
type is h with probability q = ρl/(ρh + ρl).
The optimal policy deﬁnes a tuple of continuous time processes that follow deterministic
trajectories over any interval [T2k, T2k+1). First, the belief (µt)t≥0 of the principal takes values
in the range {0, 1}. Namely, µt = 0 over any interval [T2k, T2k+1), and µt = 1 otherwise.
Second, the utilities of the agent (Ul,t, Uh,t)t≥0 are functions of his type. Finally, the expected
payoﬀ of the principal, (Wt)t≥0, is computed according to his belief µt.
The pair of processes (Ul,t, Uh,t)t≥0 takes values in V , obtained by considering the limit
(as ∆→ 0) of the formulas for {uν , uν}ν∈N. In particular, one obtains that the lower bound
is given in parametric form by
uh(τ) = (1− e−rτ )µh + e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τ (1− q)(µh − µl)),
ul(τ) = (1− e−rτ )µh − e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τq(µh − µl)),
where τ ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the requisite time for promises to be fulﬁlled under the
policy that consists of producing the good regardless of the reports until that time is elapsed.
Here, as before,
µ =
(
h− λh
λh + λl + r
(h− l), l + λl
λh + λl + r
(h− l)
)
is the utility vector achieved by providing the good forever. The upper boundary is now
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given by
uh(τ) = e
−rτµh − e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τ (1− q)(µh − µl)),
ul(τ) = e
−rτµh − e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τq(µh − µl)).
Finally, the set V is either empty or deﬁned by those utility vectors in V lying below the
graph of the curve deﬁned by
vh(τ) = e
−rτ ((1− q)U l + qUh) + e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τ (1− q)(Uh − U l)),
vl(τ) = e
−rτ ((1− q)U l + qUh)− e−rτ (1− e−(λh+λl)τq(Uh − U l)),
where (Uh, U l) are the coordinates of the largest intersection of the graph of u = (uh, ul)
with the line ul =
λl
λl+r
uh. It is immediately veriﬁable that V has a non-empty interior iﬀ
(cf. (10))
h− l
l
>
r
λl
.
Hence, the complete-information payoﬀ cannot be achieved for any utility level (aside from
0 and µ) whenever the low state is too persistent. However, V is always non-empty when
the agent is suﬃciently patient.
Figure 6 illustrates this construction. Note that the boundary of V is smooth except at
0 and µ. It is also easy to verify that the limit of the chain deﬁned by uˆν lies on the lower
boundary: Vb is asymptotically empty.
The great advantage of the Poisson system is that it allows us to explicitly solve for
payoﬀs. We sketch the details of the derivation.
How does τ – the denomination of utility on the lower boundary – evolve over time? Along
the lower boundary, it evolves continuously. On any interval over which h is continuously
reported, it evolves deterministically, with increments
dτh := −dt.
However, when l is reported, the evolution is more complicated. Algebra yields
dτ l :=
g(τ)
µ− q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)τ dt,
where
g(τ) := q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)τ + lerτ − µ,
and µ = qh+ (1− q)l, as before.
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Figure 6: Incentive-feasible set for (r, λh, λl, l, h) = (1, 10/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1).
The increment dτ l is positive or negative depending upon whether τ maps onto a utility
vector in V . If V has a non-empty interior, we can identify the value of τ that is the
intersection of the critical line and the boundary; call this value τˆ , which is simply the
positive root (if any) of g. Otherwise, set τˆ = 0.
The evolution of utility is not continuous for utilities that are not on the lower boundary.
A high report leads to a vertical shift in the utility of the low type down to the lower
boundary. See Figure 6. This change is intuitive because by promise keeping, the utility of
the high-type agent cannot jump because such an instantaneous report has only a minute
impact on his ﬂow utility. A low report, however, leads to a drift in the type’s utility.
Our goal is to derive the principal’s value function. Because his belief is degenerate,
except at the initial instant, we write Wh(τ) (resp., Wl(τ)) for the payoﬀ when (he assigns
probability one to the event that) the agent’s valuation is currently high (or low). By
deﬁnition of the policy that is followed, the value functions solve the following paired system
of equations:
Wh(τ) = rdt(h− c) + λhdtWl(τ) + (1− rdt− λhdt)Wh(τ + dτh) +O(dt2),
and
Wl(τ) = λldtWh(τ) + (1− rdt− λldt)Wl(τ + dτ l) +O(dt2).
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Assume for now (as will be veriﬁed) that the functions Wh,Wl are twice diﬀerentiable. We
then obtain the diﬀerential equations
(r + λh)Wh(τ) = r(h− c) + λhWl(τ)−W ′h(τ)
and
(r + λl)Wl(τ) = λlWh(τ) +
g(τ)
µ− q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)τW
′
l (τ)
subject to the following boundary conditions.29 First, at τ = τˆ , the value must coincide
with the value given by the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ W¯ in that range. That is, Wh(τˆ ) = W¯h(τˆ), and
Wl(τˆ ) = W¯l(τˆ). Second, as τ →∞, it must hold that the payoﬀ µ− c is approached. Hence,
lim
τ→∞
Wh(τ) = µh − c, lim
τ→∞
Wl(τ) = µl − c.
Despite having variable coeﬃcients, this system can be solved. See Section C.1 of the ap-
pendix for the solution upon which the following comparative statics are based.
Lemma 7 The value W (τ) := qWh(τ)+(1−q)Wl(τ) decreases pointwise in persistence 1/p,
where λh = pλ¯h, λl = pλ¯l, for some fixed λ¯h, λ¯l for all τ ,
lim
p→∞
W (τ) = W¯ (τ), lim
p→0
max
τ
W (τ) = max{µ− c, 0}.
The proof is in Appendix C.1. Hence, persistence hurts the principal’s payoﬀ, which is
intuitive. With independent types, the agent’s preferences are quasilinear in promised utility
such that the only source of ineﬃciency derives from the bounds on this currency. When
types are correlated, the promised utility is no longer independent of today’s types in the
agent’s preferences, reducing the degree to which this mechanism can be used to eﬃciently
provide incentives. With perfectly persistent types, there is no longer any leeway, and we are
back to the ineﬃcient static outcome. Figure 7 illustrates the value function for two levels
of persistence and compares it to the complete-information payoﬀ evaluated along the lower
locus, W¯ (the lower envelope of three curves).
What about the agent’s utility? We note that the utility of both types is increasing in τ .
Indeed, because a low type is always willing to claim that his value is high, we may compute
his utility as the time over which he would obtain the good if he continuously claimed to be of
the high type, which is precisely the deﬁnition of τ . However, persistence plays an ambiguous
29To be clear, these are not HJB equations, as there is no need to verify the optimality of the policy that
is being followed. This fact has already been established. The functions must satisfy these simple recursive
equations.
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Figure 7: Value function and complete information payoﬀs as a function of τ (here,
(λl, λh, r, l, h, c) = (p/4, 10p/4, 1, 1/4, 1, 2/5) and p = 1, 1/4).
role in determining the agent’s utility: perfect persistence is his favorite outcome if µ > c.
Hence, always providing the good is the best option in the static game. Conversely, perfect
persistence is worse if µ < c. Hence, persistence tends to improve the agent’s situation when
µ > c.30 As r → 0, the principal’s value converges to the complete information payoﬀ q(h−c).
We conclude with a rate of convergence without further discussion given the comparison with
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) described in Section 3.4.
Lemma 8 It holds that
|max
τ
W (τ)− q(h− c)| = O(r).
5.2 Continuous Types
It is important to understand the role played by the assumption that that there are only two
types. To make progress, assume here that types are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution F
with support [v, 1], v ∈ [0, 1) and density f > 0 on [v, 1]. Below, we consider the speciﬁc
case of a power distribution F (v) = va with a ≥ 1, but this example is not necessary yet.
Let µ = E[v] be the expected value of the type and hence the highest promised utility. As
30However, this convergence is not necessarily monotone, which is easy to verify via examples.
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before, we begin with the benchmark of complete information, with a lemma whose proof is
straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 9 The complete information payoff function W¯ is strictly concave. The complete
information policy is unique and of the threshold type, where the threshold v∗ is continuously
decreasing from 1 to 0 as U goes from 0 to v¯. Furthermore, given the initial promise U ,
future utility remains constant at U .
That is, given a promised utility U ∈ [0, µ], there exists a threshold v∗ such that the good is
provided if and only if the type is above v∗. Furthermore, utility does not evolve over time.
Returning to the case in which the agent privately observes his value, we prove the
following theorem:31
Theorem 4 The value function is strictly concave in U , continuously differentiable, and
strictly below the complete information payoff (except for U = 0, µ). Given U ∈ (0, µ), the
optimal policy p : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is not a threshold policy.
Once again, we note how the absence of money aﬀects the structure of the allocation. One
might have expected, given the linearity of the agent’s utility and the principal’s payoﬀ,
the solution to be “bang-bang” in p such that given some value of U , all types above a
certain threshold receive the good supplied while those below receive it with probability
zero. However, without transfers, incentive compatibility requires the continuation utility
be distorted, and the payoﬀ is not linear in the utility. Hence, consider a small interval
of types around the indiﬀerent candidate threshold type. From the principal’s perspective,
conditional on the agent being in this interval, the outcome is a lottery over p = 0, 1 and
corresponding continuation payoﬀs. Replacing this lottery with its expected value would
leave the agent virtually indiﬀerent, but the substitution would certainly help the principal,
as his continuation payoﬀ is a strictly concave function of the continuation utility.
It is diﬃcult to describe dynamics in the same level of detail as in the binary case.
However, we recover the TW-martingale: W ′ is a bounded martingale, as U -a.e.,
W ′(U) =
∫ 1
0
W ′(U(U, v))dF (v),
where U : [0, µ] × [0, 1] → [0, v¯] is the optimal policy mapping current utility and reported
type into continuation utility. Hence, because, except at U = 0, µ, U(U, ·) is not constant
(v-a.e.) and W is strictly concave, it must be that the limit is either 0 or µ and both must
occur with positive probability. Hence,
31See the additional appendix.
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Lemma 10 Given any initial level U0, the utility process Un converges to {0, µ}, with both
limits having strictly positive probability if v > 0 (If v = 0, 0 occurs a.s.).
In Appendix C.2, we explain how the optimal policy may be found using control theory
and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For a power distribution F (v) = va with a ≥ 1, there exists U∗∗ ∈ (0, µ)
such that
1. for any U < U∗∗, there exists v1 such that p(v) = 0 for v ∈ [0, v1] and p(v) is strictly
increasing (and continuous) when v ∈ (v1, 1]. The constraint U(1) ≥ 0 binds, while the
constraint p(1) ≤ 1 does not.
2. for any U ≥ U∗∗, there exists 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 1 such that p(v) = 0 for v ≤ v1, p(v) is
strictly increasing (and continuous) when v ∈ (v1, v2) and p(v) = 1 for v ≥ v2. The
constraints U(0) ≤ µ and U(1) ≥ 0 do not bind.
It is clear that indirect implementation is more diﬃcult, as the agent is no longer making
binary choices but is assigned the good with positive probability at certain values. Hence,
at the very least, the variable fee of the two-part tariﬀ that we describe must be extended
to a nonlinear schedule in which the agent pays a price for each “share” of the good that he
would like.
Markovian Types. Given the complexity of the problem, we see little hope for analytic
results with additional types once independence is dropped. We note that deriving the
incentive-feasible set is a diﬃcult task. In fact, even with three types, an explicit charac-
terization is lacking. It is intuitively clear that frontloading is the worst policy for the low
type, given some promised utility to the high type, and backloading is the best, but what
of maximizing a medium type’s utility given a pair of promised utilities to the low and high
type? It appears that the convex hull of utilities from frontloading and backloading policies
traces out the lowest utility that a medium type can obtain for any such pair, but the set of
incentive-feasible payoﬀs has full dimension. The highest utility that he can receive occurs
when one of his incentive constraints binds, but there are two possibilities, according to the
incentive constraint. We obtain two hypersurfaces that do not appear to admit closed-form
solutions. Additionally, the analysis of the i.i.d. case suggests that the optimal policy might
follow a path of utility triples on such a boundary. One might hope that assuming that
values follow a renewal process, as opposed to a general Markov process, might result in a
lower-dimensional problem, but unfortunately, we fail to see how this is possible.
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6 Concluding Comments
Here, we discuss a few obvious extensions.
Renegotiation-Proofness. The optimal policy, as described in Sections 3 and 4, is clearly
not renegotiation-proof, unlike the case with transfers (see Battaglini, 2005). After a history
of reports such that the promised utility would be zero, both agent and principal would be
better oﬀ by reneging and starting afresh. There are many ways to deﬁne renegotiation-
proofness. Strong-renegotiation (Farrell and Maskin, 1989) would lead to a lower boundary
on the utility vectors visited (except in the event that µ is suﬃciently low that it makes the
relationship altogether unproﬁtable such that U∗ = 0.) However, the structure of the optimal
policy can still be derived from the same observations. The low-type incentive-compatibility
condition and promise keeping specify the continuation utilities, unless a boundary is reached
regardless of whether it is the lower boundary (that must serve as a lower reﬂecting barrier)
or the upper absorbing boundary µ.
Public Signals. While assuming no statistical evidence whatsoever allows us to clarify
how the principal can exploit the repeated allocation decision to mitigate the ineﬃciency
entailed by private information, there are many applications for which such evidence is
available. This public signal depends on the current type and possibly on the action chosen
by the principal. For instance, if we interpret the decision as ﬁlling a position (as in labor
market applications), we might only receive feedback on the quality of the applicant if he is
hired. If, provided that the good insures the agent against a risk with a cost that might be
either high or low, the principal fails to provide a good, he might discover that the agent’s
claim was warranted.
Incomplete Information Regarding the Process. Thus far, we have assumed that
the agent’s type is drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge. This feature is
obviously an extreme assumption. In practice, the agent might have superior information
regarding the frequency with which high values arrive. If the agent knows the distribution
from the beginning, the revelation principle applies, and it is a matter of revisiting the
analysis from Section 3 with an incentive compatibility constraint at time 0.
Alternatively, the agent might not possess such information initially but be able to deter-
mine the underlying distribution from successive arrivals. This is the more challenging case
in which the agent himself is learning about q (or, more generally, the transition matrix)
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as time passes. In that case, the agent’s belief might be private (in the event that he has
deviated in the past). Therefore, it is necessary to enlarge the set of reports. A mechanism
is now a map from the principal’s belief µ (regarding the agent’s belief), a report by the
agent of this belief, denoted ν, and his report on his current type (h or l) onto a decision of
whether to allocate the good and the promised continuation utility. While we do not expect
either token or budget mechanisms to be optimal in such environments, their simplicity and
robustness suggest that they might provide valuable benchmarks.
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A Missing Proof For Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1. Based on PK and the binding ICL, we solve for uh, ul as a function
of ph, pl and U :
uh =
U − (1− δ)ph(qh+ (1− q)l)
δ
, (15)
ul =
U − (1− δ)(phq(h− l) + pll)
δ
. (16)
We want to show that an optimal policy is such that (i) either uh as deﬁned in (15) equals
0 or ph = 1; and (ii) either ul as deﬁned in (16) equals v¯ or pl = 0. Write W (U ; ph, pl) for the
maximum payoﬀ from using ph, pl as probabilities of assigning the good, and using promised
utilities as given by (15)–(16) (followed by the optimal policy from the period that follows).
Substituting uh and ul into (OBJ), we get, from the fundamental theorem of calculus, for
any ﬁxed p1h < p
2
h such that the corresponding utilities uh are interior,
W (U ; p2h, pl)−W (U ; p1h, pl) =
∫ p2
h
p1
h
{(1− δ)q (h− c− (1− q)(h− l)W ′(ul)− v¯W ′(uh))} dph.
This expression decreases (pointwise) in W ′(uh) and W ′(ul). Recall that W ′(u) is bounded
from above by 1 − c/h. Hence, plugging in the upper bound for W ′, we obtain that
W (U ; p2h, pl) − W (U ; p1h, pl) ≥ 0. It follows that there is no loss (and possibly a gain) in
increasing ph, unless feasibility prevents this. An entirely analogous reasoning implies that
W (U ; ph, pl) is nonincreasing in pl.
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It is immediate that uh ≤ ul and both uh, ul decreases in ph, pl. Therefore, either uh ≥ 0
binds or ph equals 1. Similarly, either ul ≤ v¯ binds or pl equals 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. We start the proof with some notation and preliminary remarks.
First, given any interval I ⊂ [0, µ], we write Ih :=
[
a−(1−δ)µ
δ
, b−(1−δ)µ
δ
]
∩ [0, µ] and Il :=[
a−(1−δ)U
δ
, b−(1−δ)U
δ
]
∩ [0, µ] where I = [a, b]; we also write [a, b]h, etc. Furthermore we use the
(ordered) sequence of subscripts to indicate the composition of such maps, e.g., Ilh = (Il)h.
Finally, given some interval I, we write ℓ(I) for its length.
Second, we note that, for any interval I ⊂ [U, U ], identically, for U ∈ I, it holds that
W (U) = (1− δ)(qh− c) + δqW
(
U − (1− δ)µ
δ
)
+ δ(1− q)W
(
U − (1− δ)U
δ
)
, (17)
and hence, over this interval, it follows by diﬀerentiation that, a.e. on I,
W ′(U) = qW ′(uh) + (1− q)W ′(ul).
Similarly, for any interval I ⊂ [U, µ], identically, for U ∈ I,
W (U) = (1− q)
(
U − c− (U − µ)c
l
)
+ (1− δ)q(µ− c) + δqW
(
U − (1− δ)µ
δ
)
, (18)
and so a.e.,
W ′(U) = −(1− q)(c/l − 1) + qW ′(uh).
That is, the slope of W at a point (or an interval) is an average of the slopes at uh, ul, and
this holds also on [U, µ], with the convention that its slope at ul = µ is given by 1− c/l. By
weak concavity of W , if W is aﬃne on I, then it must be aﬃne on both Ih and Il (with the
convention that it is trivially aﬃne at µ). We make the following observations.
1. For any I ⊆ (U, µ) (of positive length) such thatW is aﬃne on I, ℓ(Ih∩I) = ℓ(Il∩I) =
0. If not, then we note that, because the slope on I is the average of the other two, all
three must have the same slope (since two intersect, and so have the same slope). But
then the convex hull of the three has the same slope (by weak concavity). We thus
obtain an interval I ′ = co{Il, Ih} of strictly greater length (note that ℓ(Ih) = ℓ(I)/δ,
and similarly ℓ(Il) = ℓ(I)/δ unless Il intersects µ). It must then be that I
′
h or I
′
l
intersect I, and we can repeat this operation. This contradicts the fact the slope of W
on [0, U ] is (1− c/h), yet W (µ) = µ− c.
2. It follows that there is no interval I ⊆ [U, µ] on which W has slope (1− c/h) (because
then W would have this slope on I ′ := co{{U} ∪ I}, and yet I ′ would intersect I ′l .)
Similarly, there cannot be an interval I ⊆ [U, µ] on which W has slope 1− c/l.
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3. It immediately follows from 2 thatW < W¯ on (U, µ): if there is a U ∈ (U, µ) such that
W (U) = W¯ (U), then by concavity again (and the fact that the two slopes involved
are the two possible values of the slope of W¯ ), W must either have slope (1− c/h) on
[0, U ], or 1− c/l on [U, µ], both being impossible.
4. Next, suppose that there exists an interval I ⊂ [U, µ) of length ε > 0 such that W is
aﬃne on I. There might be many such intervals; consider the one with the smallest
lower extremity. Furthermore, without loss, given this lower extremity, pick I so that
it has maximum length, that W is aﬃne on I, but on no proper superset of I. Let
I := [a, b]. We claim that Ih ∈ [0, U ]. Suppose not. Note that Ih cannot overlap with
I (by point 1). Hence, either Ih is contained in [0, U ], or it is contained in [U, a], or
U ∈ (a, b)h. This last possibility cannot occur, because W must be aﬃne on (a, b)h,
yet the slope on (ah, U) is equal to (1 − c/h), while by point 2 it must be strictly less
on (U, bh). It cannot be contained in [U, a], because ℓ(Ih) = ℓ(I)/δ > ℓ(I), and this
would contradict the hypothesis that I was the lowest interval in [U, µ] of length ε over
which W is aﬃne.
We next observe that Il cannot intersect I. Assume b ≤ U . Hence, we have that Il
is an interval over which W is aﬃne, and such that ℓ(Il) = ℓ(I)/δ. Let ε
′ := ℓ(I)/δ.
By the same reasoning as before, we can ﬁnd I ′ ⊂ [U, µ) of length ε′ > 0 such that
W is aﬃne on I ′, and such that I ′h ⊂ [0, U ]. Repeating the same argument as often as
necessary, we conclude that there must be an interval J ⊂ [U, µ) such that (i) W is
aﬃne on J , J = [a′, b′], (ii) b′ ≥ U , there exists no interval of equal or greater length
in [U, µ) over which W would be aﬃne. By the same argument yet again, Jh must be
contained in [0, U ]. Yet the assumption that δ > 1/2 is equivalent to Uh > U , and so
this is a contradiction. Hence, there exists no interval in (U, µ) over which W is aﬃne,
and so W must be strictly concave.
This concludes the proof.
Diﬀerentiability follows from an argument that follows Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979),
using some induction. We note that W is diﬀerentiable on (0, U). Fix U > U such that
Uh ∈ (0, U). Consider the following perturbation of the optimal policy. Fix ε = (p− p¯)2, for
some p¯ ∈ (0, 1) to be determined. With probability ε > 0, the report is ignored, the good is
supplied with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and the next value is Ul (Otherwise, the optimal policy
is implemented). Because this event is independent of the report, the IC constraints are still
satisﬁed. Note that, for p = 0, this yields a strictly lower utility than U to the agent, while it
yields a strictly higher utility for p = 1. As it varies continuously, there is some critical value
47
–deﬁned as p¯– that makes the agent indiﬀerent between both policies. By varying p, we may
thus generate all utilities within some interval (U − ν, U + ν), for some ν > 0, and the payoﬀ
W˜ that we obtain in this fashion is continuously diﬀerentiable in U ′ ∈ (U − ν, U + ν). It
follows that the concave function W is minimized by a continuously diﬀerentiable function
W˜ –hence, it must be as well.
Proof of Lemma 4. We ﬁrst consider the forecaster. We will rely on Lemma 8 from the
continuous-time (Markovian) version of the game deﬁned in Section 5.1. Speciﬁcally, consider
a continuous-time model in which random shocks arrive according to a Poisson process at
rate λ. Conditional on a shock, the agent’s value is h with probability q and l with the
complementary probability. Both the shocks’ arrivals and the realized values are the agent’s
private information. This is the same model as in Subsection 5.1 where λh = λ(1−q), λl = λq.
The principal’s payoﬀ W is the same as in Proposition 2. Let W ∗ denote the principal’s
payoﬀ if the shocks’ arrival times are publicly observed. Since the principal beneﬁts from
more information, his payoﬀ weakly increases W ∗ ≥W . (The principal is guaranteed W by
implementing the continuous-time limit of the policy speciﬁed in Theorem 2.) Given that
both players are risk neutral, the model with random public arrivals is the same as the model
in which shocks arrive at ﬁxed intervals, t = 1/λ, 2/λ, 3/λ, . . . This is eﬀectively the discrete-
time model with i.i.d. values in which the round length is ∆ = 1/λ and the discount factor
is δ = e−
r
λ . Given that the loss is of the order O(r/λ) in the continuous-time private-shock
model, the loss in the discrete-time i.i.d. model is of smaller order than O(1− δ).
Basing on the analysis above, we next show that the loss is of order O(1 − δ). We
consider an allocation problem in which the agent’s ﬁrst-round type realization is private
information whereas his type realization after the ﬁrst round is public information. Let W ∗∗
denote the principal’s payoﬀ in this problem, which is larger than the principal’s payoﬀ in
the benchmark model. Let U denote the promised utility before the ﬁrst round and Ul, Uh
the promised utilities after the agent reports l, h during round one. It is optimal to set
ph = 1, pl = 0 during round one. From PK and binding ICL, we obtain
Uh =
(δ − 1)(qh− ql + l) + U
δ
, Ul =
(δ − 1)q(h− l) + U
δ
.
The principal’s payoﬀ given U is
(1− δ)q(h− c) + δ (qW¯ (Uh) + (1− q)W¯ (Ul)) , (19)
where W¯ is the complete-information payoﬀ function deﬁned in Lemma 1. The principal’s
payoﬀ W ∗∗ is the maximum of (19) over U . It is easy to verify that the eﬃciency loss
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q(h − c) −W ∗∗ is proportional to (1 − δ). Therefore, the loss in the benchmark model has
the order of O(1− δ).
We now consider the prophet. We divide the analysis in three stages. In the ﬁrst two,
we consider a ﬁxed horizon 2N + 1 and no discounting, as is usual. Let us start with the
simplest case: a ﬁxed number of copies 2N + 1, and q = 1/2.32 Suppose that we relax the
problem (so as to get a lower bound on the ineﬃciency). The number m = 0, . . . , 2N +1, of
high copies is drawn, and the information set {(m, 2N +1−m), (2N +1−m,m)} is publicly
revealed. That is, it is disclosed whether there are m high copies, of N −m high copies (but
nothing else).
The optimal mechanism consists of the collection of optimal mechanisms for each infor-
mation set. We note that, because q = 1/2, both elements in the information set are equally
likely. Hence, ﬁxing {(m, 2N + 1 − m), (2N + 1 −m,m)}, with m < N , it must minimize
the ineﬃciency
min
p0,p1,p2
(1− p0)m(h− c) + (2N + 1− 2m)(1− p1)(h− c) + p1(c− l)
2
+ p2m(c− l),
where p0, p1, p2 are in [0, 1]. To understand this expression, we note that it is common
knowledge that at least m units are high (hence, providing them with probability p0 reduces
the ineﬃciency m(h−c) from these. It is also known that m are low, which if provided (with
probability p2) leads to ineﬃciency m(c − l) and ﬁnally there are 2N + 1 − 2m units that
are either high or low, and the choice p1 in this respect implies one or the other ineﬃciency.
This program is already simpliﬁed, as p0, p1, p2 should be a function of the report (whether
the state is (m, 2N + 1 −m) or (2N + 1 −m,m)) subject to incentive-compatibility, but it
is straightforward that both IC constraints bind and lead to the same choice of p0, p1, p2 for
both messages. In fact, it is also clear that p0 = 1 and p2 = 0, so for each information set,
the optimal choice is given by the minimizer of
(2N + 1− 2m)(1− p1)(h− c) + p1(c− l)
2
≥ (2N + 1− 2m)κ,
where κ = min{h − c, c − l}. Hence, the ineﬃciency is minimized by (adding up over all
information sets)
N∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)(
1
2
)2N+1
(2N + 1− 2m)κ = Γ
(
N + 3
2
)
√
πΓ(N + 1)
κ→
√
2N + 1√
2π
κ.
32We pick the number of copies as odd for simplicity. If not, let Nature reveal the event that all copies
are high if this unlikely event occurs. This gives as lower bound for the inefficiency with 2N + 2 copies the
one we derive with 2N + 1.
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We now move on to the case where q 6= 1/2. Without loss of generality, assume q > 1/2.
Consider the following public disclosure rule. Given the realized draw of high and lows, for
any high copy, Nature publicly reveals it with probability λ = 2 − 1/q. Low copies are not
revealed. Hence, if a copy is not revealed, the principal’s posterior belief that it is high is
q(1− λ)
q(1− λ) + (1− q) =
1
2
.
Second, Nature reveals among the undisclosed balls (say, N ′ of those) whether the number of
highs is m or N ′−m, namely it discloses the information set {(m,N ′−m), (N ′−m,m)}, as
before. Then the agent makes a report, etc. Conditional on all publicly revealed information,
and given that both states are equally likely, the principal’s optimal rule is again to pick a
probability p1 that minimizes
(N ′ − 2m)(1− p1)(h− c) + p1(c− l)
2
≥ (N ′ − 2m)κ.
Hence, the total ineﬃciency is
2N+1∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)
qm(1− q)2N+1−m
(
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
λk(1− λ)m−k|2N + 1− k − 2(m− k)|
)
κ,
since with k balls revealed, N ′ = 2N +1−k, and the uncertainty concerns whether there are
(indeed) m− k high values or low values. Alternatively, because the number of undisclosed
copies is a compound Bernoulli, it is a Bernoulli random variable as well with parameter qλ,
and so we seek to compute
1√
2N + 1
2N+1∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)
(qλ)m(1− qλ)N+1−m Γ
(
N −m+ 3
2
)
√
πΓ(N −m+ 1)κ.
We note that
lim
N→∞
1√
2N + 1
2N+1∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)
(qλ)m(1− qλ)N+1−m Γ
(
N −m+ 3
2
)
√
πΓ(N −m+ 1)
= lim
N→∞
2N+1∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)
(qλ)m(1− qλ)N+1−m
√
2N − 1−m
2
√
Nπ
= sup
α>0
lim
N→∞
2N+1∑
m=0
(
2N + 1
m
)
(qλ)m(1− qλ)N+1−m
√
2N − 1− (2N + 1)qλ(1 + α)
2
√
Nπ
= sup
α>0
√
1− (1 + α)qλ√
2π
=
√
1− qλ√
2π
=
√
1− q√
π
,
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hence the ineﬃciency converges to
√
2N + 1
√
1− q√
π
κ.
Third, we consider the case of discounting. Note that, because the principal can always treat
items separately, facing a problem with k i.i.d. copies, whose value l, h is scaled by a factor
1/k (along with the cost) is worth at least as much as one copy with a weight 1. Hence, if
say, δm = 2δk, then modifying the discounted problem by replacing the unit with weight δm
by two i.i.d. units with weight δk each makes the principal better oﬀ. Hence, we ﬁx some
small α > 0, and consider N such that δN = α, i.e., N = lnα/ ln δ. The principal’s payoﬀ
is also increased if the values of all units after the N -th one are revealed for free. Hence,
assume as much. Replacing each copy k = 1, . . . , N by ⌊δk/δN⌋ i.i.d. copies each with weight
δN gives us as lower bound to the loss to the principal
sup
α
δN√∑N
k=1⌊δk/δN⌋
,
and the right-hand side tends to a limit in excess of 1
2
√
1−δ (use α = 1/2 for instance).
B Missing Proof For Section 4
Proof of Lemma 5. Let W denote the set co{uν , uν : ν ≥ 0}. The point u0 is supported
by (ph, pl) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = (µh, µl). For ν ≥ 1, uν is supported by (ph, pl) =
(0, 0), U(h) = U(l) = uν−1. The point u0 is supported by (ph, pl) = (0, 0), U(h) = U(l) =
(0, 0). For ν ≥ 1, uν is supported by (ph, pl) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = uν−1. Therefore, we
have W ⊂ B(W ). This implies that B(W ) ⊂ V .
We deﬁne four sequences as follows. First, for ν ≥ 0, let
wνh = δ
ν (1− κν) (1− q)µl,
wνl = δ
ν (1− q + κνq)µl,
and set wν = (wνh, w
ν
l ). Second, for ν ≥ 0, let
wνh = µh − δν (1− κν) (1− q)µl,
wνl = µl − δν (1− q + κνq)µl,
and set wν = (wνh, w
ν
l ). For any ν ≥ 1, wν is supported by (ph, pl) = (0, 0), U(h) = U(l) =
wν−1, and wν is supported by (ph, pl) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = wν−1. The sequence wν starts
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at w0 = (0, µl) with limν→∞wν = 0. Similarly, wν starts at w0 = (µh, 0) and limν→∞wν = µ.
We deﬁne a set sequence as follows:
W ν = co
({uk, uk : 0 ≤ k ≤ ν} ∪ {wν , wν}) .
It is obvious that V ⊂ B(W 0) ⊂ W 0. To prove that V = W , it suﬃces to show that
W ν = B(W ν−1) and limν→∞W ν = W .
For any ν ≥ 1, we deﬁne the supremum score in direction (λ1, λ2) given W ν−1 as
K((λ1, λ2),W
ν−1) = supph,pl,U(h),U(l)(λ1Uh + λ2Ul), subject to (2)–(5), ph, pl ∈ [0, 1], and
U(h), U(l) ∈ W ν−1. The set B(W ν−1) is given by
⋂
(λ1,λ2)
{
(Uh, Ul) : λ1Uh + λ2Ul ≤ K((λ1, λ2),W ν−1)
}
.
Without loss of generality, we focus on directions (1,−λ) and (−1, λ) for all λ ≥ 0. We
deﬁne three sequences of slopes as follows:
λν1 =
(1− q)(δκ− 1)κν(µh − µl)− (1− δ)(qµh + (1− q)µl)
q(1− δκ)κν(µh − µl)− (1− δ)(qµh + (1− q)µl)
λν2 =
1− (1− q) (1− κν)
q (1− κν)
λν3 =
(1− q) (1− κν)
qκν + (1− q) .
It is easy to verify that
λν1 =
uνh − uν+1h
uνl − uν+1l
=
uνh − uν+1h
uνl − uν+1l
, λν2 =
uνh − wνh
uνl − wνl
=
uνh − wνh
uνl − wνl
, λν3 =
wνh − 0
wνl − 0
=
wνh − µh
wνl − µl
.
When (λ1, λ2) = (−1, λ), the supremum score as we vary λ is
K((−1, λ),W ν−1) =


(−1, λ) · (0, 0) if λ ∈ [0, λν3]
(−1, λ) · wν if λ ∈ [λν3, λν2]
(−1, λ) · uν if λ ∈ [λν2, λν−11 ]
(−1, λ) · uν−1 if λ ∈ [λν−11 , λν−21 ]
· · ·
(−1, λ) · u0 if λ ∈ [λ01,∞)
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Similarly, when (λ1, λ2) = (1,−λ), we have
K((1,−λ),W ν−1) =


(1,−λ) · (µh, µl) if λ ∈ [0, λν3]
(1,−λ) · wν if λ ∈ [λν3 , λν2]
(1,−λ) · uν if λ ∈ [λν2 , λν−11 ]
(1,−λ) · uν−1 if λ ∈ [λν−11 , λν−21 ]
· · ·
(1,−λ) · u0 if λ ∈ [λ01,∞).
Therefore, we have W ν = B(W ν−1). Note that this method only works when parameters are
such that λν3 ≤ λν2 ≤ λν−11 for all ν ≥ 1. If ρl/(1− ρh) ≥ l/h, the proof stated above applies.
Otherwise, the following proof applies.
We deﬁne four sequences as follows. First, for 0 ≤ m ≤ ν, let
wh(m, ν) = δ
ν−m (qµh (1− δm) + (1− q)µl)− (1− q)(δκ)ν−m (µh ((δκ)m − 1) + µl) ,
wl(m, ν) = δ
ν−m (qµh (1− δm) + (1− q)µl) + q(δκ)ν−m (µh ((δκ)m − 1) + µl) ,
and set w(m, ν) = (wh(m, ν), wl(m, ν)). Second, for 0 ≤ m ≤ ν, let
wh(m, ν) =
(1− q)δνκν (µh (δmκm − 1) + µl) + κm (µhδm − δν (qµh (1− δm) + (1− q)µl))
δmκm
,
wl(m, ν) =
−qδνκν (µh (δmκm − 1) + µl) + κm (µlδm − δν (qµh (1− δm) + (1− q)µl))
δmκm
,
and set w(m, ν) = (wh(m, ν), wl(m, ν)). Fixing ν, the sequence w(m, ν) is increasing (in
both its arguments) as m increases, with limν→∞w(ν − m, ν) = um. Similarly, ﬁxing ν,
w(m, ν) is decreasing as m increases, limν→∞w(ν −m, ν) = um.
Let W (ν) = {w(m, ν) : 0 ≤ m ≤ ν} and W (ν) = {w(m, ν) : 0 ≤ m ≤ ν}. We deﬁne a
set sequence as follows:
W (ν) = co
({(0, 0), (µh, µl)} ∪W (ν) ∪W (ν)) .
Since W (0) equals [0, µh] × [0, µl], it is obvious that V ⊂ B(W (0)) ⊂ W (0). To prove
that V = W := co{uν , uν : ν ≥ 0}, it suﬃces to show that W (ν) = B(W (ν − 1)) and
limν→∞W (ν) = W . The rest of the proof is similar to the ﬁrst part and hence omitted.
Proof of Lemma 6. It will be useful in this proof and those that follows to deﬁne the
operator Bij , i, j = 0, 1. Given an arbitrary A ⊂ [0, µh]× [0, µl], let
Bij(A) := {(Uh, Ul) ∈ [0, µh]× [0, µl] : U(h) ∈ A,U(l) ∈ A solving (2)–(5) for (ph, pl) = (i, j)} ,
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and similarly Bi·(A),B·j(A) when only ph or pl is constrained.
The ﬁrst step is to compute V0, the largest set such that V0 ⊂ B·0(V0). Plainly, this is
a proper subset of V , because any promise Ul ∈ (δρlµh + δ(1 − ρl)µl, µl] requires that pl be
strictly positive.
Note that the sequence {vν} solves the system of equations, for all ν ≥ 1:
v
ν+1
h = δ(1− ρh)vνh + δρhvνl
vν+1l = δ(1− ρl)vνl + δρlvνh,
and v1l = v
0
l (From v
1
l = v
0
l and the second equation for ν = 0, we obtain that v
0 lies on
the line Ul =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)Uh.) In words, the utility vector v
ν+1 obtains by setting ph = pl = 0,
choosing as a continuation payoﬀ vector U(l) = vν , and assuming that ICH binds (so that
the high type’s utility can be derived from the report l). To prove that these vectors are
incentive feasible using such a scheme, it remains to exhibit U(h) and show that it satisﬁes
ICL. In addition, we must argue that U(h) ∈ µ. We prove by construction. Pick any vν
such that ν ≥ 1. Once we ﬁx a ph ∈ [0, 1], PKH requires that U(h) must lie on the line
δ(1− ρh)Uh(h) + δρhUl(h) = vνh − δphh. There exists a unique ph, denoted pνh, such that vν
lies on the same line as U(h) does, that is
δ(1− ρh)Uh(h) + δρhUl(h) = vνh − δpνhh = δ(1− ρh)vνh + δρhvνl .
It is easy to verify that
pνh = δ
ν (1− (1− q) (1− κν)) v
0
h
v∗h
.
Given that v0h ≤ v∗h, we have pνh ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting pνh into PKH and ICL, we want to
show that there exists U(h) ∈ µ such that both PKH and ICL are satisﬁed. It is easy to
verify that the intersection of PKH and Ul(h) =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)Uh(h) is below the intersection
of the binding ICL and Ul(h) =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)Uh(h). Therefore, the intersection of PKH and
Ul(h) =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)Uh(h) satisﬁes both PKH and ICL. In addition, the constructed PKH goes
through the boundary point vν , so the intersection of PKH and Ul(h) =
δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)Uh(h) is
inside µ.
Finally, we must show that the point v0 can itself be obtained with continuation payoﬀs
in µ. That one is obtained by setting (ph, pl) = (1, 0), set ICL as a binding constraint, and
U(l) = v0 (again one can check as above that U(h) is in µ and that ICH holds). This suﬃces
to show that µ ⊆ V0, because this establishes that the extreme points of µ can be sustained
with continuation payoﬀs in the set, and all other utility vectors in µ can be written as a
convex combination of these extreme points.
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The proof that V0 ⊂ µ follows the same lines as determining the boundaries of V in
the proof of Lemma 5: one considers a sequence of (less and less) relaxed programs, setting
Wˆ 0 = V and deﬁning recursively the supremum score in direction (λ1, λ2) given Wˆ
ν−1
as K((λ1, λ2),W
ν−1) = supph,pl,U(h),U(l) λ1Uh + λ2Ul, subject to (2)–(5), ph, pl ∈ [0, 1], and
U(h), U(l) ∈ Wˆ ν−1. The set B(Wˆ ν−1) is given by⋂
(λ1,λ2)
{
(Uh, Ul) ∈ V : λ1Uh + λ2Ul ≤ K((λ1, λ2),W ν−1)
}
,
and the set Wˆ ν = B(Wˆ ν−1) obtains by considering an appropriate choice of λ1, λ2. More
precisely, we always set λ2 = 1, and for ν = 0, pick λ1 = 0. This gives Wˆ
1 = V ∩ {U :
Ul ≤ v0l , Ul ≥ v
1
l
−v2
l
v1
h
−v2
h
(Uh − v2h)}. We then pick (for every ν ≥ 1) as direction λ the vector
(λ11, 1) · (1, (vνl − vν+1l )/(vνh − vν+1h )), and as result obtain that
µ ⊆ Wˆ ν+1 = Wˆ ν ∩
{
U : Ul ≥ v
ν+1
l − vν+2l
vν+1h − vν+2h
(Uh − vν+2h )
}
.
It follows that µ ⊆ co{{(0, 0)} ∪ {vν}ν≥0}.
Next, we argue that this achieves the complete-information payoﬀ. First, note that
µ ⊆ V ∩ {U : Ul ≤ v∗l }. In this region, it is clear that any policy that never gives the unit to
the low type while delivering the promised utility to the high type must be optimal. This is
a feature of the policy that we have described to obtain the boundary of V (and plainly it
extends to utilities U below this boundary).
Finally, one must show that above it the complete-information payoﬀ cannot be achieved.
It follows from the deﬁnition of µ as the largest ﬁxed point of B·0 that starting from any
utility vector U ∈ V \ µ, U 6= µ, there is a positive probability that the unit is given
(after some history that has positive probability) to the low type. This implies that the
complete-information payoﬀ cannot be achieved in case U ≤ v∗. For U ≥ v∗, achieving the
complete-information payoﬀ requires that ph = 1 for all histories, but it is not hard to check
that the smallest ﬁxed point of B1· is not contained in V ∩ {U : U ≥ v∗}, from which it
follows that suboptimal continuation payoﬀs are collected with positive probability.
Proof of Theorem 2 and 3. We start the proof by deﬁning the function W : V ×
{ρl, 1 − ρh} → R ∪ {−∞}, that solves the following program, for all (Uh, Ul) ∈ V , and
µ ∈ {ρl, 1− ρh},
W (Uh, Ul, µ) = sup {µ ((1− δ)ph(h− c) + δW (Uh(h), Ul(h), 1− ρh))
+ (1− µ) ((1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Uh(l), Ul(l), ρl))} ,
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over (pl, ph) ∈ [0, 1]2, and U(h), U(l) ∈ V subject to PKH, PKL, ICL. Note that ICH is
dropped so this is a relaxed problem. We characterize the optimal policy and value function
for this relaxed problem and relate the results to the original optimization problem. Note
that for both problems the optimal policy for a given (Uh, Ul) is independent of µ as µ
appears in the objective function additively and does not appear in constraints. Also note
that the ﬁrst best is achieved when U ∈ V . So, we focus on the subset V \ V .
1. We want to show that for any U , it is optimal to set ph, pl as in (14) and to choose
U(h) and U(l) that lie on Pb. It is feasible to choose such a U(h) as the intersection
of ICL and PKH lies above Pb. It is also feasible to choose such a U(l) as ICH is
dropped. To show that it is optimal to choose U(h), U(l) ∈ Pb, we need to show
that W (Uh, Ul, 1 − ρh) (resp., W (Uh, Ul, ρl)) is weakly increasing in Uh along the rays
x = (1− ρh)Uh + ρhUl (resp., y = ρlUh + (1− ρl)Ul). Let W˜ denote the value function
from implementing the policy above.
2. Let (Uh1(x), Ul1(x)) be the intersection of Pb and the line x = (1 − ρh)Uh + ρhUl. We
deﬁne function wh(x) := W˜ (Uh1(x), Ul1(x), 1−ρh) on the domain [0, (1−ρh)µh+ρhµl].
Similarly, let (Uh2(y), Ul2(y)) be the intersection of Pb and the line y = ρlUh+(1−ρl)Ul.
We deﬁne wl(y) := W˜ (Uh2(y), Ul2(y), ρl) on the domain [0, ρlµh + (1 − ρl)µl]. For any
U , let X(U) = (1− ρh)Uh+ ρhUl and Y (U) = ρlUh+(1− ρl)Ul. We want to show that
(i) wh(x) (resp., wl(y)) is concave in x (resp., y); (ii) w
′
h, w
′
l is bounded from below by
1−c/l (derivatives have to be understood as either right- or left-derivatives, depending
on the inequality); and (iii) for any U on Pb
w′h(X(U)) ≥ w′l(Y (U)). (20)
Note that we have w′h(X(U)) = w
′
l(Y (U)) = 1 − c/h when U ∈ µ. For any ﬁxed
U ∈ Pb \ (µ ∪ Vh) , a high report leads to U(h) such that (1 − ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUl(h) =
(Uh− (1− δ)h)/δ and U(h) is lower than U . Also, a low report leads to U(l) such that
ρlUh(l) + (1 − ρl)Ul(l) = Ul/δ and U(l) is higher than U if U ∈ Pb \ (µ ∪ Vh). Given
the deﬁnition of wh, wl, we have
w′h(x) = (1− ρh)U ′h1(x)w′h
(
Uh1(x)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
+ ρhU
′
l1(x)w
′
l
(
Ul1(x)
δ
)
w′l(y) = ρlU
′
h2(y)w
′
h
(
Uh2(y)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
+ (1− ρl)U ′h2(y)w′l
(
Ul2(y)
δ
)
.
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If x, y are given by X(U), Y (U), it follows that (Uh1(x), Ul1(y)) = (Uh2(y), Ul2(y)) and
hence
w′h
(
Uh1(x)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
= w′h
(
Uh2(y)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
w′l
(
Ul1(x)
δ
)
= w′l
(
Ul2(y)
δ
)
.
Next, we want to show that for any U ∈ Pb and x = X(U), y = Y (U)
(1− ρh)U ′h1(x) + ρhU ′l1(x) = ρlU ′h2(y) + (1− ρl)U ′l2(y) = 1
(1− ρh)U ′h1(x)− ρlU ′h2(y) ≥ 0.
This can be shown by assuming that U is on the line segment Uh = aUl + b. For any
a > 0, the equalities/inequality above hold. The concavity of wh, wl can be shown by
taking the second derivative
w′′h(x) = (1− ρh)U ′h1(x)w′′h
(
Uh1(x)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
U ′h1(x)
δ
+ ρhU
′
l1(x)w
′′
l
(
Ul1(x)
δ
)
U ′l1(x)
δ
w′′l (y) = ρlU
′
h2(y)w
′′
h
(
Uh2(y)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
U ′h2(x)
δ
+ (1− ρl)U ′l2(y)w′′l
(
Ul2(y)
δ
)
U ′l2(y)
δ
.
Here, we use the fact that Uh1(x), Ul1(x) (resp., Uh2(y), Ul2(y)) are piece-wise linear in
x (resp., y). For any ﬁxed U ∈ Pb ∩ Vh and x = X(U), y = Y (U), we have
w′h(x) = (1− ρh)U ′h1(x)w′h
(
Uh1(x)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
+ ρhU
′
l1(x)
l − c
l
w′l(y) = ρlU
′
h2(y)w
′
h
(
Uh2(y)− (1− δ)h
δ
)
+ (1− ρl)U ′h2(y)
l − c
l
.
Inequality (20) and the concavity of wh, wl can be shown similarly. To sum up, if wh, wl
satisfy properties (i), (ii) and (iii), they also do after one iteration.
3. Let W be the set of W (Uh, Ul, 1− ρh) and W (Uh, Ul, ρl) such that
(a) W (Uh, Ul, 1 − ρh) (resp., W (Uh, Ul, ρl)) is weakly increasing in Uh along the rays
x = (1− ρh)Uh + ρhUl (resp., y = ρlUh + (1− ρl)Ul);
(b) W (Uh, Ul, 1− ρh) and W (Uh, Ul, ρl) coincide with W˜ on Pb.
(c) W (Uh, Ul, 1− ρh) and W (Uh, Ul, ρl) coincide with W¯ on µ;
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If we pickW0(Uh, Ul, µ) ∈ W as the continuation value function, the conjectured policy
is optimal. Note that it is optimal to choose ph, pl according to (14) because w
′
h, w
′
l are
in the interval [1 − c/l, 1 − c/h]. We want to show that the new value function W1 is
also in W. Property (b) and (c) are trivially satisﬁed. We need to prove property (a)
for µ ∈ {1− ρh, ρl}. That is,
W1(Uh + ε, Ul, µ)−W1(Uh, Ul, µ) ≥W1(Uh, Ul + 1− ρh
ρh
ε, µ)−W1(Uh, Ul, µ). (21)
We start with the case in which µ = 1− ρh. The left-hand side equals
δ(1− ρh)
(
W0(U˜h(h), U˜l(h), 1− ρh)−W0(Uh(h), Ul(h), 1− ρh)
)
, (22)
where U˜(h) and U(h) are on Pb and
(1− δ)h+ δ
(
(1− ρh)U˜h(h) + ρhU˜l(h)
)
= Uh + ε,
(1− δ)h+ δ ((1− ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUl(h)) = Uh.
For any ﬁxed U ∈ V \ (µ ∪ Vh), the right-hand side equals
δρh
(
W0(U˜h(l), U˜l(l), ρl)−W0(Uh(l), Ul(l), ρl)
)
, (23)
where U˜(l) and U(l) are on Pb and
δ
(
ρlU˜h(l) + (1− ρl)U˜l(l)
)
= Ul +
1− ρh
ρh
ε,
δ (ρlUh(l) + (1− ρl)Ul(l)) = Ul.
We need to show that (28) is greater than (29). Note that U(h), U˜(h), U(l), U˜(l) are
on Pb, so only the properties of wh, wl are needed. Inequality (21) is equivalent to
w′h
(
Uh − (1− δ)h
δ
)
≥ w′l
(
Ul
δ
)
, ∀(Uh, Ul) ∈ V \ (µ ∪ Vh ∪ Vl). (24)
The case in which µ = ρl leads to the same inequality as above. Given that wh, wl
are concave, w′h, w
′
l are decreasing. Therefore, we only need to show that inequality
(24) holds when (Uh, Ul) are on Pb. This is true given that (i) wh, wl are concave; (ii)
inequality (20) holds; (iii) (Uh − (1 − δ)h)/δ corresponds to a lower point on Pb than
Ul/δ does. When U ∈ Vh, the right-hand side of (21) is given by (1 − ρh)ε(1 − c/l).
Inequality (21) is equivalent to w′h((Uh − (1 − δ)h)/δ) ≥ 1 − c/l, which is obviously
true. Similar analysis applies to the case in which U ∈ Vl.
58
This shows that the optimal policy for the relaxed problem is indeed the conjectured policy
and W˜ is the value function. The maximum is achieved on Pb and the continuation utility
never leaves Pb. Given that this optimal mechanism does not violate ICH , it is the optimal
mechanism of our original problem.
We are back to the original optimization problem. The ﬁrst observation is that we can
decompose the optimization problem into two sub-problems: (i) choose ph, U(h) to maximize
(1 − δ)ph(h − c) + δW (Uh(h), Ul(h), 1 − ρh) subject to PKH and ICL; (ii) choose pl, U(l)
to maximize (1 − δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Uh(l), Ul(l), ρl) subject to PKL and ICH . We want to
show that the conjecture policy with respect to ph, U(h) is the optimal solution to the ﬁrst
sub-problem. This can be shown by taken the value function W˜ as the continuation value
function. We know that the conjecture policy is optimal given W˜ because (i) it is always
optimal to choose U(h) that lies on Pb due to property (a); (ii) it is optimal to set ph to be
1 because w′h lies in [1 − c/l, 1 − c/h]. The conjecture policy solves the ﬁrst sub-problem
because (i) W˜ is weakly higher than the true value function point-wise; (ii) W˜ coincides with
the true value function on Pb. The analysis above also implies that ICH binds for U ∈ Vt.
Next, we show that the conjecture policy is the solution to the second sub-problem.
For a ﬁxed U ∈ Vt, PKL and ICH determines Uh(l), Ul(l) as a function of pl. Let γh, γl
denote the derivative of Uh(l), Ul(l) with respect to pl
γh =
(1− δ)(lρh − h(1− ρl))
δ(1− ρh − ρl) , γl =
(1− δ)(hρl − l(1− ρh))
δ(1− ρh − ρl) .
It is easy to verify that γh < 0 and γh+γl < 0. We want to show that it is optimal to set pl to
be zero. That is, among all feasible pl, Uh(l), Ul(l) satisfying PKL and ICH, the principal’s
payoﬀ from the low type, (1 − δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Uh(l), Ul(l), ρl), is the highest when pl = 0.
It is suﬃcient to show that within the feasible set
γh
∂W (Uh, Ul, ρl)
∂Uh
+ γl
∂W (Uh, Ul, ρl)
∂Ul
≤ (1− δ)(c− l)
δ
, (25)
where the left-hand side is the directional derivative ofW (Uh, Ul, ρl) along the vector (γh, γl).
We ﬁrst show that (25) holds for all U ∈ Vb. For any ﬁxed U ∈ Vb, we have
W (Uh, Ul, ρl) = ρl
(
(1− δ)(h− c) + δwh
(
Uh − (1− δ)h
δ
))
+ (1− ρl)δwl
(
Ul
δ
)
.
It is easy to verify that ∂W/∂Uh = ρlw
′
h and ∂W/∂Ul = (1 − ρl)w′l. Using the fact that
w′h ≥ w′l and w′h, w′l ∈ [1− c/l, 1− c/h], we prove that (25) follows. Using similar arguments,
we can show that (25) holds for all U ∈ Vh.
59
Note that W (Uh, Ul, ρl) is concave on V . Therefore, its directional derivative along the
vector (γh, γl) is monotone. For any ﬁxed (Uh, Ul) on Pb, we have
lim
ε→0
γh
∂W (Uh+γhε,Ul+γlε,ρl)
∂Uh
+ γl
∂W (Uh+γhε,Ul+γlε,ρl)
∂Ul
−
(
γh
∂W (Uh,Ul,ρl)
∂Uh
+ γl
∂W (Uh,Ul,ρl)
∂Ul
)
ε
=γh
2ρl
δ
w′′h
(
Uh − (1− δ)h
δ
)
+ γl
2 1− ρl
δ
w′′l
(
Ul
δ
)
≤ 0.
The last inequality follows as wh, wl are concave. Given that (γh, γl) points towards the
interior of V , (25) holds within V .
For any x ∈ [0, (1−ρh)µh+ρhµl], let z(x) be ρlUh1(x)+(1−ρl)Ul1(x). The function z(x) is
piecewise linear with z′ being positive and increasing in x. Let µ0 denote the prior belief of the
high type. We want to show that the maximum of µ0W (Uh, Ul, 1−ρh)+(1−µ0)W (Uh, Ul, ρl)
is achieved on Pb for any prior µ0. Suppose not. Suppose (U˜h, U˜l) ∈ V \ Pb achieves
the maximum. Let U0 (resp., U1) denote the intersection of Pb and (1 − ρh)Uh + ρhUl =
(1 − ρh)U˜h + ρhU˜l (resp., ρlUh + (1 − ρl)Ul = ρlU˜h + (1 − ρl)U˜l). It is easily veriﬁed that
U0 < U1. Given that (U˜h, U˜l) achieves the maximum, it must be true that
W (U1h , U
1
l , 1− ρh)−W (U0h , U0l , 1− ρh) < 0
W (U1h , U
1
l , ρl)−W (U0h , U0l , ρl) > 0.
We show that this is impossible by arguing that for any U0, U1 ∈ Pb and U0 < U1,
W (U1h , U
1
l , 1− ρh)−W (U0h , U0l , 1− ρh) < 0 implies that W (U1h , U1l , ρl)−W (U0h , U0l , ρl) < 0.
It is without loss to assume that U0, U1 are on the same line segment Uh = aUl+b. It follows
that
W (U1h , U
1
l , 1− ρh)−W (U0h , U0l , 1− ρh) =
∫ s1
s0
w′h(s)ds
W (U1h , U
1
l , ρl)−W (U0h , U0l , ρl) = z′(s)
∫ s1
s0
w′l(z(s))ds,
where s0 = (1 − ρh)U0h + ρhU0l and s1 = (1 − ρh)U1h + ρhU1l . Given that w′h(s) ≥ w′l(z(s))
and z′(s) > 0,
∫ s1
s0
w′h(s)ds < 0 implies that z
′(s)
∫ s1
s0
w′l(z(s))ds < 0.
The optimal U0 is chosen such that X(U0) maximizes µ0wh(x) + (1− µ0)wl(z(x)) which
is concave in x. Therefore, at x = X(U0) we have
µ0w
′
h(X(U0)) + (1− µ0)w′l(z(X(U0)))z′(X(U0)) = 0.
According to (20), we know that w′h(X(U0)) ≥ 0 ≥ w′l(z(X(U0))). Therefore, the derivative
above is weakly positive for any µ′0 > µ0 and hence U0 increases in µ0.
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C Missing Proof for Section 5
C.1 Continuous Time
We directly work with the expected payoﬀ W (τ) = qWh(τ) + (1 − q)Wl(τ). Let τ0 denote
the positive root of
w0(τ) := µe
−rτ − (1− q)l.
As is easy to see, this root always exists and is strictly above τˆ , with w0(τ) > 0 iﬀ τ < τˆ .
Finally, let
f(τ) := r − (λh + λl)w0(τ)
g(τ)
erτ .
It is then straightforward to verify (though not quite as easy to obtain) that33
Proposition 2 The value function of the principal is given by
W (τ) =


W¯1(τ) if τ ∈ [0, τˆ),
W¯1(τ)− w0(τ)h−lhl crµ
∫ τ
τˆ
e
−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
w2
0
(t)
dt
∫
∞
τˆ
λh+λl
g(t)
e
2rt−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
dt
if τ ∈ [τˆ , τ0),
W¯1(τ) + w0(τ)
h−l
hl
c

1 + rµ ∫∞τ e
−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
w2
0
(t)
dt
∫
∞
τˆ
λh+λl
g(t)
e
2rt−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
dt

 if τ ≥ τ0,
where
W¯1(τ) := (1− e−rτ )(1− c/h)µ.
It is straightforward to derive the closed-form expressions for complete-information payoﬀ,
which we omit here.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof has three steps. We recall that W (τ) = qWh(τ) + (1 −
q)Wl(τ). Using the system of diﬀerential equations, we get(
erτ l + q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)τ − µ) ((r + λh)W ′(τ) +W ′′(τ))
= (h− l)qλhe−(λh+λl)τW ′(τ) + µ(r(λh + λl)W (τ) + λlW ′(τ)− rλl(h− c)).
It is easily veriﬁed that the functionW given in Proposition 2 solves this diﬀerential equation,
and hence is the solution to our problem. Let w := W − W¯1. By deﬁnition, w solves a
homogeneous second-order diﬀerential equation, namely,
k(τ)(w′′(τ) + rw′(τ)) = rµw(τ) + erτw0(τ)w
′(τ), (26)
33As τ → t0, the integrals entering in the definition of W diverge, although not W itself, given that
limτ→t0 w0(τ) → 0. As a result, limτ→t0 W (τ) is well-defined, and strictly below W1(t0).
61
with boundary conditions w(τˆ) = 0 and limτ→∞w(τ) = −(1− l/h)(1− q)c. Here,
k(τ) :=
q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)τ + lerτ − µ
λh + λl
.
By deﬁnition of τˆ , k(τ) > 0 for τ > τˆ . First, we show that k increases with persistence
1/p, where λh = pλ¯h, λl = pλ¯l, for some λ¯h, λ¯l ﬁxed independently of p > 0. Second, we
show that rµw(τ)+ erτw0(τ)w
′(τ) < 0, and so w′′(τ)+ rw′(τ) < 0 (see (26)). Finally we use
these two facts to show that the payoﬀ function is pointwise increasing in p. We give the
arguments for the case τˆ = 0, the other case being analogous.
1. Diﬀerentiating k with respect to p (and without loss setting p = 1) gives
dk(τ)
dp
=
µ
λ¯h + λ¯l
− e
−(λ¯h+λ¯l)τ (h− l)λ¯l(1 + (λ¯l + λ¯h)τ)
(λ¯h + λ¯l)2
− l
λ¯h + λ¯l
erτ .
Evaluated at τ = τˆ , this is equal to 0. We majorize this expression by ignoring the
term linear in τ (underlined in the expression above). This majorization is still equal
to 0 at 0. Taking second derivatives with respect to τ of the majorization shows that
it is concave. Finally, its ﬁrst derivative with respect to τ at 0 is equal to
h
λ¯l
λ¯h + λ¯l
− l r + λ¯l
λ¯h + λ¯l
≤ 0,
because r ≤ h−l
l
λ¯l whenever τˆ = 0. This establishes that k is decreasing in p.
2. For this step, we use the explicit formulas for W (or equivalently, w) given in Propo-
sition 2. Computing rµw(τ) + erτw0(τ)w
′(τ) over the two intervals (τˆ , τ0) and (τ0,∞)
yields on both intervals, after simpliﬁcation,
−
h−l
hl
c∫∞
τˆ
λ¯h+λ¯l
rvg(t)
e
2rt−∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
dt
erτe−
∫ τ
τˆ
fsds < 0.
[The fraction can be checked to be negative. Alternatively, note that W ≤ W¯1 on
τ < τ0 is equivalent to this fraction being negative, yet W¯1 ≥ W¯ (W¯1 is the ﬁrst branch
of the complete-information payoﬀ), and because W solves our problem it has to be
less than W¯1.]
3. Consider two levels of persistence, p, p˜, with p˜ > p. Write w˜, w for the corresponding
solutions to the diﬀerential equation (26), and similarly W˜ ,W . Note that W˜ ≥ W
is equivalent to w˜ ≥ w, because W¯1 and w0 do not depend on p. Suppose that there
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exists τ such that w˜(τ) < w(τ) yet w˜′(τ) = w′(τ). We then have that the right-hand
sides of (26) can be ranked for both persistence levels, at τ . Hence, so must be the
left-hand sides. Because k(τ) is lower for p˜ than for p (by our ﬁrst step), because k(τ)
is positive and because the terms w′′(τ) + rw′(τ), w˜′′(τ) + rw˜′(τ) are negative, and
ﬁnally because w˜′(τ) = w′(τ), it follows that w˜′′(τ) ≤ w′′(τ). Hence, the trajectories
of w and w˜ cannot get closer: for any τ ′ > τ , w(τ) − w˜(τ) ≤ w(τ ′) − w˜(τ ′). This is
impossible, because both w and w˜ must converge to the same value, −(1− l/h)(1−q)c,
as τ → ∞. Hence, we cannot have w˜(τ) < w(τ) yet w˜′(τ) = w′(τ). Note however
that this means that w˜(τ) < w(τ) is impossible, because if this were the case, then by
the same argument, since their values as τ →∞ are the same, it is necessary (by the
intermediate value theorem) that for some τ such that w˜(τ) < w(τ) the slopes are the
same.
Proof of Lemma 8. The proof is divided into two steps. First we show that the
diﬀerence in payoﬀs between W (τ) and the complete-information payoﬀ computed at the
same level of utility u(τ) converges to 0 at a rate linear in r, for all τ . Second, we show that
the distance between the closest point on the graph of u(·) and the complete-information
payoﬀ maximizing pair of utilities converges to 0 at a rate linear in r. Given that the
complete-information payoﬀ is piecewise aﬃne in utilities, the result follows from the triangle
inequality.
1. We ﬁrst note that the complete-information payoﬀ along the graph of u(·) is at most
equal to max{W¯1(τ), W¯2(τ)}, where W¯1 is deﬁned in Proposition 2 and
W¯2(τ) = (1− e−rτ )(1− c/l)µ+ q(h/l − 1)c.
These are simply two of the four aﬃne maps whose lower envelope deﬁnes W¯ , see
Section 3.1 (those for the domains [0, v∗h]× [0, v∗l ] and [0, µh]× [v∗l , µl]). The formulas
obtain by plugging in uh, ul for Uh, Ul, and simplifying. Fix z = rτ (note that as r → 0,
τˆ →∞, so that changing variables is necessary to compare limiting values as r → 0),
and ﬁx z such that lez > µ (that is, such that g(z/r) > 0 and hence z ≥ rτˆ for small
enough r). Algebra gives
lim
r→0
f(z/r) =
(ez − 1)λhl − λlh
lez − µ ,
and similarly
lim
r→0
w0(z/r) = (qh− (ez − 1)(1− q)l)e−z,
63
as well as
lim
r→0
g(z/r) = lez − µ.
Hence, ﬁxing z and letting r → 0 (so that τ →∞), it follows that
w0(τ)
∫ τ
τˆ
e
−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
w20(t)
dt
∫
∞
τˆ
λh+λl
g(t)
e
2rt−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
dt
converge to a well-deﬁned limit. (Note that the value of τ0 is irrelevant to this quantity,
and we might as well use rτ0 = ln(µ/((1− q)l)), a quantity independent of r). Denote
this limit κ. Hence, for z < rτ0, because
lim
r→0
W¯1(z/r)−W (z/r)
r
=
h− l
hl
cκ,
it follows that W (z/r) = W¯1(z/r) +O(r). On z > rτ0, it is immediate to check from
the formula of Proposition 2 that
W (τ) = W¯2(τ) + w0(τ)
h− l
hl
crµ
∫ τ
τˆ
e
−
∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
w20(t)
dt∫∞
τˆ
λh+λl
g(t)
e
2rt−∫ t
τ0
f(s)ds
dt
.
[By deﬁnition of τ0, w0(τ) is now negative.] By the same steps it follows thatW (z/r) =
W¯2(z/r) +O(r) on z > rτ0. Because W = W¯1 for τ < τˆ , this concludes the ﬁrst step.
2. For the second step, note that the utility pair maximizing complete-information payoﬀ
is given by v∗ =
(
r+λl
r+λl+λh
h, λl
r+λl+λh
h
)
. (Take limits from the discrete game.) We
evaluate u(τ)− v∗ at a particular choice of τ , namely
τ ∗ =
1
r
ln
µ
(1− q)l .
It is immediate to check that
ul(τ
∗)− v∗l
qr
= −uh(τ
∗)− v∗h
(1− q)r =
l + (h− l)
(
(1−q)l
µ
) r+λl+λh
r
r + λl + λh
→ l
λl + λh
,
and so ‖u(τ ∗)− v∗‖ = O(r). It is also easily veriﬁed that this gives an upper bound on
the order of the distance between the polygonal chain and the point v∗. This concludes
the second step.
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C.2 Continuous Types
Proof of Theorem 4. By the principle of optimality, letting S := W − U ,
S(U) = δ
∫
S(U(U, v))dF − (1− δ)cEF [q(v)],
over q : [v, 1]→ [0, 1] and U : [0, µ]× [v, 1] → [0, µ], subject to
U =
∫
((1− δ)q(v)v + δU(U, v))dF,
and, for all v, v′ ∈ [v, 1],
(1− δ)q(v)v + δU(U, v) ≥ (1− δ)q(v′)v + δU(U, v′).
Note that the dependence of q on U is omitted. By the usual arguments, it follows that q is
nondecreasing and diﬀerentiable a.e., with (1− δ)q′(v)v + δ ∂U(U,v)
∂v
= 0, and so
U(U, v) = U(U, v)− 1− δ
δ
(
vq(v)− vq(v)−
∫ v
v
q(s)ds
)
.
This formula is also correct if q is discontinuous. Promise keeping becomes
U = δU(U, v) + (1− δ)
(
vq(v) +
∫ 1
v
(1− F (v))q(v)dv
)
.
So, the objective S(U) equals
sup
{
δ
∫
S
(
U
δ
− 1− δ
δ
(
vq(v)−
∫ v
v
q(s)ds−
∫ 1
v
(1− F (v))q(v)ds
))
dF − (1− δ)cEF [q(v)]
}
,
over q : [v, 1]→ [0, 1], nondecreasing, and the feasibility restriction
∀v ∈ [v, 1] : U − (1− δ)
(
vq(v)−
∫ v
v
q(s)ds−
∫ 1
v
(1− F (v))q(v)ds
)
∈ [0, δµ].
We note that, by the envelope theorem,
S ′(U) =
∫
S ′(U(U, v))dF.
We restrict attention to the case in which q(v) = 0, q(1) = 1, slight adjustments might be
necessary otherwise.
Again, let us suppose contrary to the assumption that S ′ is constant over some interval I.
Pick two points in this interval, U1 < U2. Given U = λU1+(1−λ)U2, λ ∈ (0, 1), consider the
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policy qλ,Uλ that uses qλ = λq1+(1−λ)q2, and similarly Uλ(·, v) = λU1(·, v)+(1−λ)U2(·, v).
To be clear, this is the strategy that consists, for every report v, in giving the agent the good
with probability qλ(v) = λq1(v) + (1 − λ)q2(v), and transiting to the utility the averages
of the utility after v under the policy starting at U1 and U2 (more generally, the weighted
average given the sequence of reports). We note that, given risk neutrality of the agent, this
policy induces the agent to report truthfully (since he does both at U1 and at U2), and gives
him utility U , by construction.
We claim that, given U , and for any given v, S ′(U(U1, v)) = S ′(U(U2, v)). If not, then
there exists v such that S ′(U(U1, v)) 6= S ′(U(U2, v)) and some U ′ = λU(U1, v)+(1−λ)U(U2, v)
in between these two values such that S(U ′) > λS(U(U1, v)) + (1 − λ)S(U(U2, v)). Then,
consider using the policy that uses qλ,Uλ for one step and then reverts to the optimal policy.
Because it does at least as well as the average of the two policies for all values of v, and does
strictly better for v, it is a strict improvement, a contradiction.
Hence, we may assume that S ′(U(U1, v)) = S ′(U(U2, v)). We next claim that this im-
plies that, without loss, q1(·) = q2(·). Indeed, we can divide [v, 1] into those (maximum
length) intervals over which S ′(U(U1, v)) = S ′(U(U2, v)) and those over which S ′(U(Ui, v)) >
S ′(U(U−i, v)), for some i = 1, 2. On any interval of values of v over which U(U1, v) = U(U2, v),
it follows from the formula above, namely,
U(U, v) = U(U, v′)− 1− δ
δ
∫ v
v′
sdq(s),
that the variation is the same for q1 and q2 (Since the function U(U, v) is the same). Over
intervals of values of v over which S ′ is independent of i, S must be aﬃne over the ranges
[mini{U(Ui, v)},maxi{U(Ui, v)}], sot that, because S is aﬃne, it follows from the Bellman
equation that U does not matter for the optimal choice of q either.
Hence, q1(·) = q2(·). It follows that, if for some v, U(U1, v) = U(U2, v), it must also
be that U(U1, ·) = U(U2, ·). This is impossible, because then U1 = U2, by promise-keeping.
Hence, there is no v such that U(U1, v) = U(U2, v), and S is aﬃne on the entire range
of U(U1, ·),U(U2, ·). In fact, the values of U(U1, ·) must be translates of those of U(U2, ·).
Without loss, we might take [U1, U2] to be the largest interval over which S is aﬃne. Given
that q(v) = 0 < q(1) = 1, neither U(U1, ·) nor U(U2, ·) is degenerate (that is, constant).
Therefore, the only possibility is that both the range of U(U1, ·) and that of U(U2, ·) are in
[U1, U2]. This is impossible given promise keeping and that q1(·) = q2(·).
For clarity of exposition, we assume that the agent’s value v is drawn from [v, v] (instead
of [v, 1]) according to F with v ∈ [0, v). Let x1(v) = p(v) and x2(v) = U(U, v). The optimal
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policy x1, x2 is the solution to the control problem
max
u
∫ v
v
(1− δ)x1(v)(v − c) + δW (x2(v))dF,
subject to the law of motion x′1 = u and x
′
2 = −(1 − δ)vu/δ. The control is u and the law
of motion captures the incentive compatibility constraints. We deﬁne a third state variable
x3 to capture the promise-keeping constraint
x3(v) = (1− δ)vx1(v) + δx2(v) + (1− δ)
∫ v
v
x1(s)(1− F (s))ds.
The law of motion of x3 is x
′
3(v) = (1− δ)x1(v)(F (v)− 1).34 The constraints are
u ≥ 0
x1(v) ≥ 0, x1(v) ≤ 1
x2(v) ≤ v¯, x2(v) ≥ 0
x3(v) = U, x3(v)− (1− δ)vx1(v)− δx2(v) = 0.
Let γ1, γ2, γ3 be the costate variables and µ0 the multiplier for u ≥ 0. For the rest of this
sub-section the dependence on v is omitted when no confusion arises. The Lagrange is
L = ((1− δ)x1(v − c) + δW (x2)) f + γ1u− γ21− δ
δ
vu+ γ3(1− δ)x1(F − 1) + µ0u.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂u
= γ1 − γ21− δ
δ
v + µ0 = 0
γ˙1 = − ∂L
∂x1
= (1− δ) (γ3(1− F )− f(v − c))
γ˙2 = − ∂L
∂x2
= −δfW ′(x2)
γ˙3 = − ∂L
∂x3
= 0.
34Note that the promise-keeping constraint can be rewritten as
U = (1− δ)vx1(v) + δx2(v) + (1− δ)
∫ v
v
x1(s)(1 − F (s))ds.
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The transversality conditions are
γ1(v) ≤ 0, γ1(v) + (1− δ)vγ3(v) ≤ 0,
γ1(v)x1(v) = 0, (γ1(v) + (1− δ)vγ3(v)) (1− x1(v)) = 0,
γ2(v) ≥ 0, γ2(v) + δγ3(v) ≥ 0,
γ2(v)(v¯ − x2(v)) = 0, (γ2(v) + δγ3(v))x2(v) = 0,
γ3(v) and γ3(v) free.
The ﬁrst observation is that γ3(v) is constant, denoted γ3. Moreover, given γ3, γ˙1 involves
no endogenous variables. Therefore, for a ﬁxed γ1(v), the trajectory of γ1 is ﬁxed. Whenever
u > 0, we have µ0 = 0. The ﬁrst-order condition
∂L
∂u
= 0 implies that
γ2 =
δγ1
(1− δ)v and γ˙2 =
δ (γ1 − vγ˙1)
(δ − 1)v2 .
Given that γ˙2 = −δfW ′(x2), we could determine the state x2
x2 = (W
′)−1
(
vγ˙1 − γ1
(δ − 1)fv2
)
. (27)
The control u is given by −x˙2δ/((1−δ)v). As the promised utility varies, we conjecture that
the solution can be one of the three cases.
Case one occurs when U is intermediate: There exists v ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v such that x1 = 0
for v ≤ v1, x1 is strictly increasing when v ∈ (v1, v2) and x1 = 1 for v ≥ v2. Given that u > 0
iﬀ v ∈ (v1, v2), we have
x2 =


(W ′)−1
(
vγ˙1−γ1
(δ−1)fv2
)∣∣∣
v=v1
if v < v1
(W ′)−1
(
vγ˙1−γ1
(δ−1)fv2
)
if v1 ≤ v ≤ v2
(W ′)−1
(
vγ˙1−γ1
(δ−1)fv2
)∣∣∣
v=v2
if v > v2,
and
x1 =


0 if v < v1
− δ
1−δ
∫ v
v1
x˙2
s
ds if v1 ≤ v ≤ v2
1 if v > v2.
The continuity of x1 at v2 requires that
− δ
1− δ
∫ v2
v1
x˙2
s
ds = 1. (28)
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The trajectory of γ2 is given by
γ2 =


δγ1
(1−δ)v1 + δ(F (v1)− F (v))
v1γ˙1(v1)−γ1(v1)
(δ−1)f(v1)v21
if v < v1
δγ1
(1−δ)v if v1 ≤ v ≤ v2
δγ1
(1−δ)v2 − δ(F (v)− F (v2))
v2γ˙1(v2)−γ1(v2)
(δ−1)f(v2)v22
if v > v2.
If (W ′)−1
(
v1γ˙1(v1)−γ1(v1)
(δ−1)f(v1)v21
)
< v¯ and (W ′)−1
(
v2γ˙1(v2)−γ1(v2)
(δ−1)f(v2)v22
)
> 0, the transversality condition
requires that
δγ1(v1)
(1− δ)v1 + δF (v1)
v1γ˙1(v1)− γ1(v1)
(δ − 1)f(v1)v21
= 0 (29)
δγ1(v2)
(1− δ)v2 − δ(1− F (v2))
v2γ˙1(v2)− γ1(v2)
(δ − 1)f(v2)v22
= −δγ3. (30)
We have four unknowns v1, v2, γ3, γ1(v) and four equations, (28)–(30) and the promise-
keeping constraint. Alternatively, for a ﬁxed v1, (28)–(30) determine the three other un-
knowns v2, γ3, γ1(v). We need to verify that all inequality constraints are satisﬁed.
Case two occurs when U is close to 0: There exists v1 such that x1 = 0 for v ≤ v1 and x1
is strictly increasing when v ∈ (v1, v]. The x1(v) ≤ 1 constraint does not bind. This implies
that γ1(v) + (1− δ)vγ3 = 0. When v > v1, the state x2 is pinned down by (27).
From the condition that γ1(v) + (1 − δ)vγ3(v) = 0, we have that W ′(x2(v)) = 1 − c/v.
Given strict concavity of W and W ′(0) = 1 − c/v, we have x2(v) = 0. The constraint
x2(v) ≥ 0 binds, so (30) is replaced with
δγ1(v)
(1− δ)v + δγ3 ≤ 0,
which is always satisﬁed given that γ1(v) ≤ 0. From (29), we can solve γ3 in terms of v1.
Lastly, the promise-keeping constraint pins down the value of v1. Note that the constraint
x1(v) ≤ 1 does not bind. This requires that
− δ
1− δ
∫ v
v1
x˙2
s
ds ≤ 1. (31)
There exists a v∗1 such that this inequality is satisﬁed if and only if v1 ≥ v∗1. When v1 < v∗1,
we move to case one. We would like to prove that the left-hand side increases as v1 decreases.
Note that γ3 measures the marginal beneﬁt of U , so it equals W
′(U).
Case three occurs when v > 0 and U is close to µ: There exists v2 such that x1 = 1 for
v ≥ v2 and x2 is strictly increasing when v ∈ [v, v2). The x1(v) ≥ 0 constraint does not bind.
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This implies that γ1(v) = 0. When v < v2, the state x2 is is pinned down by (27). From the
condition that γ1(v) = 0, we have that W
′(x2(v)) = 1 − c/v. Given strict concavity of W
and W ′(v¯) = 1− c/v, we have x2(v) = v¯. The constraint x2(v) ≤ 1 binds, so (29) is replaced
with
δγ1(v)
(1− δ)v ≤ 0,
which is always satisﬁed given that γ1(v) ≤ 0. From (30), we can solve γ3 in terms of v2.
Lastly, the promise-keeping constraint pins down the value of v2. Note that the constraint
x1(v) ≥ 0 does not bind. This requires that
− δ
1− δ
∫ v2
v
x˙2
s
ds ≤ 1. (32)
There exists a v∗2 such that this inequality is satisﬁed if and only if v2 ≤ v∗2. When v2 > v∗2,
we move to case one.
Proof of Proposition 1. To illustrate, we assume that v is uniform on [0, 1]. The proof
for F (v) = va with a > 1 is similar. We start with case two. From condition (29), we solve
for γ3 = 1 + c(v1 − 2). Substituting γ3 into γ1(v), we have
γ1(v) =
1
2
(1− δ)(1− v)(v(c(v1 − 2) + 2)− cv1).
The transversality condition γ1(0) ≤ 0 is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst-order condition ∂L∂u = 0 is also
satisﬁed for v ≤ v1. Let G denote the function
(
(W ′)−1
)′
. We have
− δ
1− δ
∫ 1
v1
x˙2
s
ds = − δ
(1 − δ)
∫ 1
v1
G
(
1− c+ c
2
(
v1 − v1
s2
)) cv1
s3
1
s
ds
= − δ
(1 − δ)
∫ 0
v1−1/v1
G
(
1− c+ c
2
x
) c
2
√
1− x
v1
dx.
The last equality is obtained by the change of variables. As v1 decreases, v1 − 1/v1 de-
creases and
√
1− x/v1 increases. Therefore, the left-hand side of (31) indeed increases as
v1 decreases.
We continue with case one. From (29) and (30), we can solve for γ3 and γ1(v)
γ3 = 1 + c
(
v1(2v2 − 1)
v22
− 2
)
,
γ1(v) =
1
2
(δ − 1)
(
v
(
(v − 2)
(
c
(
v1(2v2 − 1)
v22
− 2
)
+ 1
)
− 2c+ v
)
+ cv1
)
.
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It is easily veriﬁed that γ1(0) ≤ 0, γ1(1) ≤ 0, and the ﬁrst-order condition ∂L∂u = 0 is satisﬁed.
Equation (28) can be rewritten as
− δ
1− δ
∫ v2
v1
x˙2
s
ds = − δ
(1− δ)
∫ v2
v1
G
(
1− c+ c
2
(
v1(2v2 − 1)
v22
− v1
s2
))
cv1
s3
1
s
ds = 1.
For any v1 ≤ v∗1 , there exists v2 ∈ (v1, 1) such that (28) is satisﬁed.
Transfers with Limited Liability. Here, we consider the case in which transfers are
allowed but the agent is protected by limited liability. Therefore, only the principal can pay
the agent. The principal maximizes his payoﬀ net of payments. The following lemma shows
that transfers occur on the equilibrium path when the ratio c/l is higher than 2.
Lemma 11 The principal makes transfers on path if and only if c− l > l.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that the principal makes transfers if c− l > l. Suppose not. The
optimal mechanism is the same as the one characterized in Theorem 1. When U is suﬃciently
close to µ, we want to show that it is “cheaper” to provide incentives using transfers. Given
the optimal allocation (ph, uh) and (pl, ul), if we reduce ul by ε and make a transfer of
δε/(1 − δ) to the low type, the IC/PK constraints are satisﬁed. When ul is suﬃciently
close to µ, the principal’s payoﬀ increment is close to δ(c/l− 1)ε− δε = δ(c/l− 2), which is
strictly positive if c− l > l. This contradicts the fact that the allocation (ph, uh) and (pl, ul)
is optimal. Therefore, the principal makes transfers if c− l > l.
If c−l ≤ l, we ﬁrst show that the principal never makes transfers if ul, uh < µ. With abuse
of notation, let tm denote the current-period transfer after m report. Suppose um < µ and
tm > 0. We can increase um (m = l or h) by ε and reduce tm by δε/(1− δ). This adjustment
has no impact on IC/PK constraints and strictly increases the principal’s payoﬀ given that
W ′(U) > 1 − c/l when U < µ.35 Suppose ul = µ and tl > 0. We can always replace pl, tl
with pl + ε, tl − εl. This adjustment has no impact on IC/PK and (weakly) increases the
principal’s payoﬀ. If ul = µ, pl = 1, we know that the promised utility to the agent is at
least µ. The optimal scheme is to provide the unit forever.
35It is easy to show that the principal’s complete-information payoff, if U ∈ [0, µ] and c− l ≤ l, is the same
as W¯ in Lemma 1.
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